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LANDOWNER-LESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
ANTHONY J. FEJFAR*
As one looks back along the historic road traversed by
the law of land in England and in America, one sees a
change from the view that he who owns may do as he pleases
with what he owns, to a position which hesitatingly embodies
an ingredient of stewardship; which grudgingly, but steadily,
broadens the recognized scope of social interest in the utili-
zation of things.'
INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA)2 is one of the most significant environ-
mental statutes in force today. CERCLA is of special concern to land-
owner-lessors because, subject to limited statutory defenses,3 it has
been interpreted to impose strict liability upon property owners for
cleanups relating to the release or threatened release of hazardous
substances on the owner's land.4 This Article focuses on the liability
of landowner-lessors for releases of hazardous substances on leased
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. B.A., 1981, Creigh-
ton University;J.D., 1985, University of Nebraska College of Law. The author would like to
thank Mike Cozzillio, Jim May, Judi Fejfar, and Brenda Sue Thornton for commenting on
earlier drafts of this article. The author would also like to thank John DeLorenzo for
excellent research assistance.
1. 5A RicHARD IR POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 746 (Patrick J. Rohan ed.,
rev. ed., 1993).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 [hereinafter "The 1980 Act"], amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 to 9675 (1988)) [hereinafter "SARA" when
referring to the entire 1986 act, and "CERCLA" when referring to The 1980 Act as
amended by SARA].
According to one commentator, "CERCLA has set the hazardous waste remedial
agenda since its enactment and has profoundly and permanently changed the approach of
parties to transactions involving industrial, commercial, and many residential properties."
JOEL S. MosKowITz, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL PROPERTY TRANsACrIONS: LAw AND
PRACTICE 48 (1989).
3. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). See also infra text accompanying
note 106.
4. See infra text accompanying note 204 (quoting New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985), which held that CERCLA imposes strict liability upon an
owner for the release or threat of release of hazardous substances).
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premises caused by the acts or omissions of tenants in possession.
This issue is significant both academically and practically. Although
the release or threatened release of hazardous substances into the en-
vironment is a serious matter in its own right, the gravity of the release
or threat of a release is compounded by the fact that a cleanup can
cost millions of dollars.5 Whether these costs will be borne by private
individuals (including landowner-lessors), or by the federal govern-
ment (and indirectly by taxpayers and consumers), is an issue of great
concern. Should a landowner-lessor be permitted to avoid liability for
clean-up costs merely by including environmentally nonrestrictive lan-
guage in the lease, and then engaging in absentee landlord practices?
Or should a landowner-lessor of a building leased as a retail clothing
store, for example, be held liable for clean-up costs when, in spite of
periodic inspections by the landlord, the tenant dumped hazardous
substances on the leased premises in violation of a restrictive lease
clause? In answering these questions, this Article considers whether
or not an "innocent landlord" defense is available to a landowner-les-
sor. As the Article discusses, the courts are in conflict as to the availa-
bility of such a defense. Moreover, even where courts have recognized
such a defense, the criteria for determining its availability are subject
to criticism.
When interpreting a statute such as CERCLA, it is appropriate to
refer first to the "statutory language and then to the legislative history
if the statutory language is unclear."6 Courts have described CERCLA
as "a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague
terminology,"7 and as being "far from... a model of statutory or syn-
5. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) (holding defendants jointly and severally liable for response
costs in the amount of $1,813,624).
6. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 167 n.10 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896
(1984), which notes that when "resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute
and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and then to the
legislative history if the statutory language is unclear"). The court in Monsanto Co. deter-
mined that the "plain language" in § 107(a) of CERCLA clearly created a "strict liability
scheme," and that therefore the court did not need to examine the legislative history. See
id. at 167. On the other hand, the court in Shore Realty considered the legislative history of
The 1980 Act in its interpretation of the liability provisions of § 107(a) even though it
found the statutory language clear. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044-45.
7. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838
n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 848 (1987). As a result, the court observed, "[t]he courts are once again placed in
the undesirable and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation." Id. at
839 n.15.
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tactic clarity."8 These general observations are no less true with re-
spect to many of the issues that this Article will consider.
Accordingly, the discussion and analysis presented in this Article
is preceded first by an overview of the statutory language and followed
by a description of the legislative history. In its discussion and analy-
sis, the Article first examines "owner" liability under Section 107(a) of
CERCLA. That section imposes liability upon current "owners" of a
"facility" and upon any past "owners" at the time "disposal of the haz-
ardous substances took place."9 The Article concludes that there is
little basis for interpreting Section 107(a) as providing an "innocent
landlord defense" for landowner-lessors. The possibility that a land-
owner could assert an "innocent landlord defense" under the "third-
party defense" of Section 107(b) is examined next. Pursuant to CER-
CIA Section 107(b) (3), a landowner-lessor can assert a "third-party
defense" if the landowner can establish that: (1) the act or omission
causing the "release or threatened release" is not that of an employee
or agent of the defendant; (2) the act or omission has not occurred
"in connection with" a direct or indirect contractual relationship be-
tween the landowner-lessor and the defendant; and (3) the defendant
has exercised the requisite due care and has taken precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions. 10
With respect to the "third-party defense," the Article first dis-
cusses case law in which courts have failed to consider the "in connec-
tion with" language found in Section 107(b) (3). These cases are
critiqued on the basis of a linguistic analysis of the statute. The Article
then discusses cases in which courts have considered and analyzed the
"in connection with" language of Section 107(b) (3). This latter group
of cases is found objectionable because the test that courts have em-
ployed therein provides an incentive for landowner-lessors to become
"absentee landlords" who do nothing either to restrict or to monitor
the activities of the tenant in possession. Therefore, an alternative test
to prevent absentee-landlord practices is proposed. This test encour-
ages landowner-lessors to include, monitor, and enforce appropriate
lease clauses that restrict the presence of hazardous substances on the
leased premises.
Additionally, this Article discusses the "third-party defense" as ap-
plied to the liability of a landowner-lessor for the acts or omissions of a
sublessee in possession. This Article suggests that a landowner-lessor
8. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
9. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
10. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
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should be considered to have an "indirect contractual relationship"
with a sublessee in possession for purposes of the Section 107(b)(3)
"third-party defense." Finally, this Article entertains and addresses
several hypothetical objections to its discussion and analysis.
I. OVERVIEW OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE
Section 107(a) of CERCLA imposes liability for "response costs""'
incurred in relation to a "release or threatened release" 2 of "hazard-
11. Pursuant to § 107(a) (4), the United States Government, a State, or an Indian
Tribe, in appropriate circumstances, may bring an action for the recovery of "response
costs." CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). Response costs recoverable
under Section 107 are not defined in CERCLA, but "response" is defined in § 101 (25), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988), to include "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action").
See also 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES
704 (1992). "Generally speaking, response costs include all those expenditures under-
taken to identify, interdict, combat, and mitigate hazardous substances releases." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). When the United States or a State seeks recovery, courts have held that a
defendant must prove that the cost incurred by a State or the United States was "not incon-
sistent with the national contingency plan" in order to avoid liability. ALFRED R. LIGrr,
CERCLA LAw AND PROCEDURE 82 (1991) (citations omitted) (quoting CERCLA
§ 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (A) (4) (B) (1988)). A private person seeking recovery of
response costs, on the other hand, has been required to prove that the costs incurred were
"consistent with the national contingency plan." Id. The "national contingency plan" gov-
erns a variety of subjects, including worker safety, documentation, and "CERCLA-quality
cleanup." Id. at 84-86. See also RODGERS, supra, at 705 (noting that "among the costs recov-
erable are not only the investigatory costs, but also the costs of dikes and trenches used as
containment measures, the costs of removing drummed waste and disposing of contami-
nated soil, and the costs of administration and oversight, litigation and supervision, plan-
ning and enforcement."). Finally, in addition to response costs, §107(a) provides a cause
of action to recover damages relating to the loss of natural resources. See CERCLA,
§ 107(a) (4) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (C) (1988).
12. Pursuant to § 101 (22), the term "release" means:
[A] ny spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, inject-
ing, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including
the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed recepta-
cles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but ex-
cludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons solely within a
workplace, with respect to a claim which such persons may assert against the em-
ployer of such persons, (B) emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle,
rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of
source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those
terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, if such release is subject to
requirements with respect to financial protection established by the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission under section 170 of such Act, or, for the purposes of section
9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of source byproduct, or
special nuclear material from any processing site designated under section
7912(a) (1) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal application of fertilizer.
CERCLA § 101 (22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (22) (1988). Furthermore, "[a)s the courts have inter-
preted the 'release' threshold, it is very low indeed. The presence of hazardous substances
in soil or groundwater, deteriorating or leaking drums, or any other environmental pres-
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ous substances" i" into the environment.1 4 This liability must be borne
by the current "owners" or "operators" " of a "facility,"16 and by past
ence from any known industrial, manufacturing, or storage facility may be sufficient evi-
dence to establish a release." LIGHTr, supra note 11, at 68-69 (citations omitted).
13. Pursuant to § 101(14), the term "hazardous substance" means:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321 (b) (2) (A) of Title 33, (B)
any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to
section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics iden-
tified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed
under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act, and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical
substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include petroleum, in-
cluding crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed
or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of
this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids,
liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas
and such synthetic gas).
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). See also LIGHT, supra note 11, at 72-73.
"[Subsection 101 (14)] has been construed to bring within the definition of 'hazardous sub-
stance' any material on any of the lists in the section. Courts will neither second-guess
EPA's listings nor exclude a material from the definition of hazardous substance because it
is not a hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)." Id
(citations omitted).
14. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See also infra note 184 (quoting
CERCLA § 107(a)). Pursuant to § 101(8), the term "environment" means:
(A) the navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, and the ocean
waters for which the natural resources are under the exclusive management au-
thority of the United States under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act, and (B) any other surface water, ground water, drinking water
supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United States
or under the jurisdiction of the United States.
CERCLA § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (1988). A release into the "environment" may in-
clude: "burial of waste chemicals containing hazardous substances, spraying of hazardous
substances along highways, releases to a 'water column' from rusting capacitors, a gas emit-
ted from radionuclides, or releases of asbestos to the ambient air." LIGHT, supra note 11, at
70 (citations omitted).
15. Pursuant to § 101 (20) (A), the term "owner or operator" means:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise,
such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any per-
son owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or
control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency,
abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any per-
son who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility imme-
diately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
CERCLA § 101 (20), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (1988).
Although § 107(a) (1) refers to the "owner and operator," the courts have concluded
that Congress really meant "owner or operator," and thus have disregarded a "literal" inter-
pretation of the language. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp.
1994]
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"owners" or "operators" at the time when "disposal"1 7 of the hazard-
ous substances took place." Although Section 107(a) has been inter-
preted as imposing joint, several, and strict liability without regard to
fault,19 Section 107(b) provides certain defenses to liability.2 °
For example, pursuant to the "third-party defense" of Section
107(b) (3), liability will not be imposed upon a "person"21 that other-
573, 577 (D. Md. 1986) (interpreting "and" in the disjunctive and holding that a party does
not have to be both an owner and an operator to be held liable under § 107(a)(1)).
16. Pursuant to § 101(9), the term "facility" means:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (includ-
ing any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond,
lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but
does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
CERCLA § 101 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (9) (1988). A "facility" can exist, for example, where
oil contaminated with hazardous substances has been sprayed on the ground to suppress
dust. United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1303, 1305 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
17. Pursuant to § 101 (29), the term "'disposal' ... shall have the meaning provided in
section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act." CERCLA § 101 (29), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)
(1988). Section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act provides:
(3) The term 'disposal' means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spill-
ing, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land
or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988). "[S]everal courts have held that...
leakage of pollutants while a person operates a facility makes him an operator at the time
of disposal." LiGHT, supra note 11, at 71 (citation omitted). Furthermore, commentators
have noted that "[a ] n alternate view is that the term 'disposal' is not simply a subcategory of
the larger universe of 'releases.' Disposal can be read more narrowly to imply the idea of
someone doing something with the hazardous substance. The converse may also be true.
Waste can be disposed of without its release into the environment." Id. (citation omitted).
18. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See also infra note 184 (quoting
CERCLA § 107(a)).
19. E.g., NewYork v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042-45 (2d Cir. 1985) (observ-
ing that "section (107(a) (1)] unequivocally imposes strict liability"). See also RODGERS, supra
note 11, at 685 (noting that "[l]iability is not only strict under Section 107; it is also joint
and several, which means that each and every contributor is presumptively liable for the
entire clean up bill"). Actions for contribution have been permitted even though, pursu-
ant to The 1980 Act, there was no express statutory language providing for contribution.
See id. at 686-87. Notwithstanding the absence of express language providing for contribu-
tion, pre-SARA courts held that a responsible person under § 107(a) could bring an action
for contribution against another potentially responsible person. Id. at 687. The 1986
Amendments, however, included a specific provision for contribution. CERCLA
§ 113(0(1) and (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) and (2) (1988).
20. See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). See also infra note 106.
21. Under § 101(21), the term "person" means: "[A]n individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Gov-
ernment, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." CERCLA § 101 (21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988).
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wise would be covered if that person can establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that: (1) the "release" or "threatened release" of the
hazardous substances was caused solely by "an act or omission of a
third party other than an employee or an agent of the defendant, or
than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contrac-
tual relationship, existing directly or indirectly with the defendant";
(2) the defendant "exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substances concerned"; and (3) the defendant "took precautions
against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party ....
CERCLA Section 101 (35) defines the term "contractual relation-
ship" for purposes of Section 107(b) (3) of CERC[A to include, but
not be limited to, "land contracts, deeds or other instruments transfer-
ring title or possession," unless the defendant can meet the remaining
conditions set forth in Section 101 (35).23 Finally, CERCLA provides
a de minimis settlement provision that "innocent" or "almost inno-
cent" landowners can attempt to utilize.2 4
II. LEGisLATIrE HIsToRY
A. Legislative Histoy of The 1980 Act
Six years of work in the House of Representatives and three in the
Senate culminated in the 1980 CERCLA legislation. 25 Given this long
period of legislative ferment, one might assume that the legislative
history preceding enactment of the final legislation would be very illu-
minating, but generally that is not the case. Although the legislative
history provides some interpretive assistance, its usefulness is ham-
pered by the circumstances preceding passage of the final bill. Three
bills, House Bill 85,26 House Bill 7020,27 and Senate Bill 1480,28 con-
tributed to the final legislation,2 9 but "[n]one of these bills, as intro-
duced or reported out of committee, was enacted into law. Instead,
Congress ultimately adopted a compromise measure that was first
22. CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988).
23. CERCLA § 101 (35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). See also infra text accompanying
note 180 (quoting CERCIA § 101(35)).
24. CERCLA § 122(g) (1) and (2). See also infra text accompanying note 184 (quoting
CERCLA § 122(g) (1) and (2)).
25. 1 SUPERFUND: A LEGisLATivE HISTORY xiii (Helen C. Needham and Mark Menefee,
eds., 1982) [hereinafter SUPERFUND].
26. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
27. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
28. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
29. SeeJ.P. Sean Maloney, A Legislative History of Liability Under CERCLA, 16 SETON HALL
LEGIS.J. 517, 518 (1992) (noting that H.R. 85, H.R. 7020, and S. 1480 became part of the
final CERCLA legislation).
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presented on the Senate floor.""° Therefore, much of CERCLA's
early legislative history refers to language that differs from that found
in The 1980 Act. Nevertheless, the language and scope of the prede-
cessor bills is sufficiently similar that an analysis of the legislative his-
tory provides some useful insights. Accordingly, before discussing the
final compromise legislation, this Article will examine the relevant lia-
bility provisions of each of the three predecessor bills.
House Bill 85 was introduced by Representative Mario Biaggi on
January 15, 1979. s t The final version of House Bill 85, as amended
and passed by the House on September 19, 1980,2 "imposed joint,
several, and strict liability on the owners and operators of vessels and
facilities discharging oil or designated hazardous substances into navi-
gable waters." 3 Of particular interest is the fact that Section 101 of
House Bill 85 appears to exempt from its definition of "owner" all
"passive" landowner-lessors: "' [O]wner'... does not include a person who
... holds title to or any indicia of ownership of a vessel or facility and
without participating in the management or operation of such vessel or facil-
ity, leases or charters to any other person (with whom such person is
not otherwise affiliated) .. .
Representative Florio introduced House Bill 7020 on April 2,
1980."5 "The bill was intended to regulate inactive sites bearing haz-
ardous wastes, other than oil, on land and in non-navigable waters by
a reporting, monitoring and clean-up scheme." 6 Representative
Florio described the conditions that provided the impetus for the bill:
"Hundreds, possibly thousands, of neglected, leaking disposal sites
presently dot the country, threatening to release their lethal contents,
despoiling water supplies and menacing public health."" Thus, Rep-
resentative Florio believed that " [p] reventive measures [were] needed
immediately to stop further releases. Remedial action [was] urgently
needed at those sites which [were then] causing serious problems."38
30. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at xiii. See also Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8
COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 1 (1982) (noting that "[a] Carter Administration proposal, S. 1341, was
submitted in the early days of the Ninety-Sixth Congress, but it was sidetracked.") (citation
omitted). Accordingly, S. 1341 will not be discussed here.
31. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at xiii.
32. 126 CONG. REc. 26,391 (1980).
33. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at xiv.
34. Id. at 31 (emphasis added). "Upon receiving H.R. 85 from the House, the Senate
referred it to the Committee on Environment and Public Works, where the bill died." Id.
35. Id. at xv.
36. Maloney, supra note 29, at 521.
37. 126 CONG. REC. 26,337 (1980).
38. Id.
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With respect to the liability aspect of the bill, Florio saw a broad "pre-
vention-incentive" purpose, stating: "[The liability provision of the
bill] assures that the costs of chemical poison releases are borne by
those responsible for the releases. It creates a strong incentive both
for prevention of releases and voluntary cleanup of releases by respon-
sible parties. Finally, it replenishes the fund . . .,,"
House Bill 7020 was reported out of committee to the House in
two parts in May and June of 1980. ° Section 3071 of the reported bill
imposed strict liability for clean-up costs upon any person who
"caused or contributed" to a "release or threatened release," of "haz-
ardous waste into the environment from or at any inactive site .... "
Liability was "joint and several," unless the generator, transporter,
owner, or operator could identify the portion of the clean-up costs
39. Id. at 26,338.
40. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119 (H.R. 7020 reported out of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on May 16, 1980); H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 11 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6151 (H.R. 7020 reported out of the House Ways and Means
Comm. on June 20, 1980).
41. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). The text of § 3071 (a) provided:
Sec. 3071. (a) Liability-(1) Except for a release or threatened release, of
hazardous waste which the defendant establishes to be caused solely by-
(A) an act of God or an act of war,
(B) negligence on the part of the Government of the United States,
(C) an act or omission of a third party if the defendant establishes that he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous waste, or
(D) any combination of the foregoing where any release, or threatened re-
lease, of hazardous waste into the environment from or at an inactive site causes
any costs described in subsection (b), any person who caused or contributed to
the release or threatened release shall be strictly liable for such costs. Except as
provided in paragraph (2), such liability shall be joint and several with any other
person who caused or contributed to such release.
(2) (A) If a generator or transporter of hazardous waste establishes that only
a portion of the total costs described in subsection (b) are attributable to hazard-
ous waste generated or transported by him, such generator or transporter shall be
liable under this subsection only for such portion. If the owner or operator of
any inactive hazardous waste site establishes that only a portion of the total costs
described in subsection (b) are attributable to hazardous waste which was treated,
stored, or disposed of in a period during which he owned or operated the site,
such owner or operator shall be liable under this section only for such portion.
(B) To the extent apportionment is not established under subparagraph (A),
the court shall apportion the liability, to the maximum extent practicable, among
the parties based upon evidence presented by the parties as to their
contributions.
(C) Following any apportionment under this paragraph, no person shall be
required to pay in excess of his apportioned share of the total costs described in
subsection (b).
3 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at 150-51.
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that were attributable to their own status or activity, in which case that
person would be held liable only for that portion of the costs.42
Section 3071 of House Bill 7020 clearly established a "third-party
defense."4" This defense eliminated liability of a defendant for "a re-
lease, or threatened release, of hazardous waste which the defendant
establishe[d] to be caused solely by- ... (C) an act or omission of a
third party if the defendant establishe [d] that he exercised due care
with respect to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into considera-
tion the characteristics of such hazardous waste ....
On September 23, 1980, the House resolved itself into a "Com-
mittee of the Whole" in order to consider amendments to House Bill
7020 (as reported out of committee)." At the beginning of the de-
bate Representative Stockman offered an "amendment in the nature
of a substitute."46 The Stockman substitute bill "essentially provided a
system of federal formula grants for state cleanup and remedial pro-
grams for inactive hazardous waste sites."47 Representative Florio ar-
gued against the proposed amendment, asserting that strong federal
liability provisions were needed to provide incentives for parties to en-
gage in voluntary cleanups.48 Representative Martin also opposed the
Stockman substitute. 49 Although Martin's remarks were not entirely
clear, he seems to have been suggesting that House Bill 7020 could,
and should, be used to hold absentee landowner-lessors responsible
for wastes dumped by their tenants, while the Stockman substitute
could not. Martin asserted:
As an example of absentee ownership of sites, three sites
near Verona, Mo., have been identified as possibly contain-
ing dioxin wastes. The dioxin was produced between 1969
and 1972 by one company which had rental equipment and
space from another business which is headquartered in Con-
42. See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a) (2) (A) (1980).
43. See id. § 3071 (a)(1)(C).
44. Id. § 3071(a) (1).
45. See 126 CONG. REc. 26,757 (1980).
46. Id.
47. Grad, supra note 30, at 15.
48. See 126 CONC. REc. 26,761 (1980). Rep. Florio stated:
The strong liability provisions that are in our bill that are not in [Rep. Stockman's]
proposal I believe are very important, because we want to induce those who know
where these sites are to remedy the sites themselves. If there is no liability provi-
sion, they will not have any incentive whatsoever to go forward on a voluntary
basis and clean up those sites.
Id
49. See id. at 26,768.
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necticut. Now that the Missouri manufacturer has declared
bankruptcy, the State may not have anyone to hold liable.5 °
The House of Representatives rejected the Stockman substitute bill.51
Later on the same day, Representative Gore offered two amend-
ments to House Bill 7020.52 These amendments related to the "third-
party defense" and the apportionment of liability under the bill.53
Gore noted that the bill, as then drafted, would have allowed a de-
fendant to "escape liability for a release or threatened release of haz-
ardous waste if [the defendant could] demonstrate that such was
'caused solely by... an act or omission of a third party if the defend-
ant establishe [d] that he exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous waste concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of
such hazardous waste."' 54 Gore found this provision objectionable be-
cause "a defendant [could] avoid liability, despite being engaged in an
ultrahazardous activity, by contracting with a third party to dispose of
the hazardous waste."
55
Representative Gore's concern with this provision stemmed from
his belief that the liability provisions of the bill were much more leni-
ent than were common law rules relating to strict liability for ul-
trahazardous or abnormally dangerous activities. 56 Gore asserted that
under the common law doctrine of vicarious liability for ul-
trahazardous activities a defendant could not avoid liability simply by
contracting for the activity to be performed by a third party.5 Gore
50. Id. at 26,769.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 26,781.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 26,782 (quoting § 307(a)(1)(C) of the version of H.R. 7020 then under
discussion).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 26,783. With respect to common law liability, Gore stated that "[t] here can be
little doubt that actions involving hazardous waste would be considered by the courts as
abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activity sufficient to subject a responsible party to
strict liability." Id. at 26,782. Similarly, "it is inconceivable that actions involving hazardous
waste would not be considered abnormally dangerous. Strict liability would thus be im-
posed upon anyone responsible for a release of such waste." Id. According to Gore, the
policy consideration underlying the common law strict liability doctrine, as he considered
it to apply, was that "while the generation and disposal of hazardous waste are deemed a
necessary evil in our society, 'the unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in (handling
waste) requires that it be carried on at (the defendant's) peril, rather than at the expense
of the innocent person who suffers harm as a result of it.' The defendant, then, is basically
an 'insurer' against the consequences of his abnormally dangerous conduct." Id. (para-
phrasing from comment h to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977)).
57. See id. Rep. Gore stated:
Related to the doctrine of strict liability is the rule that holds a defendant liable
for injuries resulting from inherently dangerous activity even though he/she con-
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believed that his amendment, which ultimately was incorporated into
House Bill 7020 and passed by the House,5" struck a "middle ground"
between the common law as he described it and the version of House
Bill 7020 reported out of committee.59 Gore described the "third-
party defense" set forth in his amendment as a limited defense: "My
amendment would restrict the application of the third party defense
to situations where the third party is not an employee or agent of the
defendant, or where the third party's act or omission does not occur
in connection with a contractual relationship."' Then, in a seemingly
inconsistent statement, Gore said that "the amendment would permit
a defendant to escape liability for damages caused by the act or omis-
sion of a third party who has no connection whatsoever with the de-
fendant and which act or omission is unforeseeable."61 Consistent
with his initial statement, however, he then stated that "with regard to
foreseeable acts by third parties, the amendment requires that a de-
fendant demonstrate that he acted with due care in order to escape
liability. This insures that the defendant will not escape liability if he
acted negligently, even if the damage caused is the result of an act of
an unrelated third party."
62
The second amendment proposed by Representative Gore al-
tered the joint and several liability provisions of House Bill 7020.6"
Gore noted in his remarks that under the reported version of House
Bill 7020, the language relating to joint and several liability was ren-
dered effectively meaningless by the "exceptions" to such liability.
64
tracted with a third party for the performance of that activity. This is basically a
rule of vicarious liability, whereby the employer is held liable for the negligence
of the independent contractor, regardless of whether the employer himself has
been at fault.
Id.
58. See id. at 26,798-99.
59. See id, at 26,783. See generally H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 3071 (a) (1) and (2)
(1980). Rep. Gore stated:
My amendment moves H.R. 7020 closer to the common law in several ways. First,
the amendment removes the ability of and incentive for a defendant to contract
away liability.
The amendment would insure that the common law rules of both strict and
vicarious liability remain intact in cases in which a defendant seeks to shift the
responsibility for costs resulting from his ultrahazardous activity to others with
whom he is involved in a business relationship.
126 CONG. REc. 26,783 (1980).
60. 126 CONG. REc. 26,783 (1980).
61. Id. See also infra note 261 (discussing this statement further and presenting a plausi-
ble explanation for Gore's seemingly inconsistent statements).
62. 126 CONG. REc. 26,783 (1980).
63. See id. at 26,785.
64. See id. at 26,784. Rep. Gore stated:
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In Gore's view, his second amendment (which ultimately was incorpo-
rated into the bill and passed by the House)65 moved the legislation
closer to common law principles of joint and several liability.66
Following the introductory remarks of Representative Gore,
members of the House held a general discussion among themselves.
Especially relevant to the present inquiry are the seemingly confusing
assertions made concerning the requirement that a person have
"caused or contributed to [a] release or threatened release" in order
to be held liable. 67 Speaking in favor of the Gore amendments, Rep-
resentative Madigan emphasized that, according to his understanding
of the "causation" requirement, in order "for liability to attach under
[the bill as amended], the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal or con-
tributory nexus between the acts of the defendant and the conditions
which necessitated response action .... "'
Speaking against the bill as amended, Representative Stockman
expressed concern that the liability provisions were too broad and
would result in a search for "deep pockets."6" Apparently in response
Subsection (2) (B) ... provides that even if the defendants do not establish the
apportionability of the remaining damages, the court shall itself apportion the
liability. Subsection (2) (B) goes on to provide that once this apportionment has
been made by the court, no defendant shall be liable for more than his appor-
tioned share.. The effect is that no one defendant can ever be held responsible
for the full amount of the damages. Thus, there actually is no joint and several
liability in H.R 7020.
Id. at 26,785.
65. See id. at 26,798-99. See generally H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a) (1980).
66. See 126 CONG. REC. 26,785 (1980). Rep. Gore stated:
My amendment would move H.R. 7020 closer to the common law by insuring
that to achieve apportionment under section 2(A), a defendant must prove ap-
portionability by a preponderance of the evidence. This is the common law stan-
dard, and it should be part of any legislation like this. My amendment would also
make this bill more in tune with the common law by making the apportionment
under section 2(B) discretionary on the part of the court. Instead of requiring
apportionment in all cases, as the present legislation does, the amendment per-
mits a court to apportion liability when equity requires it. This would enable a
court to apportion liability when sufficient evidence allows it, but to deny appor-
tionment when there is no real basis for it. The amendment assists the court in its
task by providing a list of factors specifically geared to the problems inherent in
hazardous waste generation and disposal.
Id.
67. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a)(1) (1980). See also supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
68. 126 CONG. REc. 26,785 (1980) (referring to H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. I, at 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6136).
69. Id. at 26,786. Rep. Stockman stated:
[O]nce [the people at EPA] move ahead and clean up, then their first action after
that cleanup order or that cleanup financing if they do it directly or through the
State government, will be to see if they can find some deep pocket somewhere in
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to Representative Stockman, Representative Gore stated: "Of course,
under strict liability, proof of causation would first have to occur. "70
Representative Stockman then asked Representative Gore whether lia-
bility was "automatic" for any operator of a site or waste generator that
cannot satisfy the elements of a Section 107(b) defense.7' Representa-
tive Gore answered that " [p] roof of causation must occur. One must
prove the damage was caused by the defendant. There is not an auto-
matic trigger. But once the damage is proven to have been caused by
the defendant, then a strict liability standard would apply."72 Repre-
sentative Stockman rejoined, "I would just say in response to the gen-
tleman that I realize causation has to be shown, but in this context the
only requirement to show causation is that somebody contributed to
the site."7 ' Representative Gore then insisted that "one must first
prove causation. If one cannot prove the defendant caused the dam-
age which led to the suit, then the strict liability standard is never
triggered. 7
4
Representative Gore concluded his remarks by stating that the
"causation" requirement he had described was nothing new, citing the
old English case of Rylands v. Fletcher5 as authority.76 Gore apparently
was suggesting that the defendant landowner in Rylands "caused or
contributed" to the damages that occurred when a reservoir the de-
fendant had built upon his property broke and damaged an adjoining
landowner's property.77 The House adopted the Gore amendments
and, having concluded its discussion and consideration of several
the vicinity who contributed, not that ran a disposal site, not that ran a transporta-
tion company, but just an industrial firm, a foundry, a plastics plant, anything that
contributed waste any time in the foggy past that might be included in this list of
1,165 items that I have read.
And once they have found that deep pocket, they will immediately go to
court and sue that deep pocket, and then all of the onus of the law, all of the
burden will be on him to prove that he was not responsible for an outcome that
occurred 30 years later as a result of this retroactive liability.
Id.
70. Id. at 26,787.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868). For an interesting discussion of Rylands, nui-
sance, and strict liability in tort for landowners, see William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without
Fault, 20 TEX. L. REv. 399 (1942).
76. 126 CONG. REc. 26,787 (1980).
77. See id See also Rylands, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 332 (holding that a landowner is
strictly liable for any damage caused by things that he brings upon his land, if those things
would not be there naturally, and if they are dangerous and "mischievous" if not kept
under control).
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other amendments, passed the amended version of H.R. 7020 later in
the day of September 23, 1980.78
78. See 126 CONG. REc. 26,799 (1980). The full text of § 3071 (a), of H.R. 7020 (as
amended) is as follows:
Sec. 3071. (a) Liability.-(1) Except for a release, or threatened release, of
hazardous waste which the defendant establishes to be caused solely by-
(A) an act of God or an act of war,
(B) negligence on the part of the Government of the United States,
(C) an act or omission of a third party other than (i) an employee or agent
of the defendant, or (ii) a person whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant,
if the defendant establishes that he exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous waste concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazard-
ous waste, or
(D) any combination of the foregoing where any release, or threatened re-
lease, of hazardous waste into the environment from or at an inactive hazardous
waste site causes any costs described in subsection (b), any person who caused or
contributed to the release or threatened release shall be strictly liable for such
costs. Except as provided in paragraph (3), such liability shall be joint and several
with any other person who caused or contributed to such release.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) (C) a defendant (including any person
involved in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of haz-
ardous waste) must demonstrate that he exercised due care with respect to all
foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party and that he exercised due care in
light of all relevant facts and circumstances.
(3) (A) If a generator or transporter of hazardous waste establishes by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that only a portion of the total costs described in
subsection (b) are attributable to hazardous waste generated or transported by
him, such generator or transporter shall be liable under this subsection only for
such portion. If the owner or operator of any inactive hazardous waste site estab-
lishes by a preponderance of the evidence that only a portion of the total costs
described in subsection (b) are attributable to hazardous waste which was treated,
stored, or disposed of in a period during which he owned or operated the site,
such owner or operator shall be liable under this section only for such portion.
(B) To the extent apportionment is not established under subparagraph (A),
the court may apportion the liability among the parties where deemed appropri-
ate based upon evidence presented by the parties as to their contribution. In
apportioning liability under this subparagraph, the court may consider among
other factors, the following:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a
discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of hazardous waste involved;
(iii) the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
(iv) the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, trans-
portation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the haz-
ardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such haz-
ardous waste;
(vi) the degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local
officials to prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
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"H.R. 7020, as passed by the House ... authorized the govern-
ment to respond to a dangerous release of a hazardous waste, includ-
ing oil, or a substantial threat of such a release, at an abandoned or an
inactive hazardous waste site."79 The bill established a six hundred
million dollar response fund to finance cleanups.80 With respect to
liability, "the bill provided that anyone who 'causes or contributes' to
a release of a hazardous waste from an abandoned or inactive waste
site would be jointly, severally, and strictly liable for governmental
emergency, removal, and containment costs, as well as specified pri-
vate damages. " " "Following passage by the House, H.R. 7020 was sent
to the Senate, which referred it to the Environment and Public Works
Committee."82 For various reasons, however, "[n] either the Commit-
tee nor the full Senate formally considered the House version [of]
H.R. 7020 .... ,"8 The Senate had been working instead on Senate
Bill 1480, its own version of the bill.8"
Senators Muskie, Stafford, Chafee, Randolph, and Moynihan in-
troduced Senate Bill 1480 onJuly 11, 1979.85 The Bill provided that a
broad category of persons involved with the release or disposal of a
hazardous substance could be held 'Jointly, severally, and strictly lia-
ble for the resulting governmental remedial and response costs, as
well as an assortment of privately incurred damages."86 Medical ex-
penses were included among the list of recoverable damages. 87
Senate Bill 1480, as introduced, imposed joint, several, and strict
liability upon
the owner or operator of a vessel or an onshore or offshore
facility from which a hazardous substance is discharged, re-
leased, or disposed of .... and any other person who caused
or contributed or is causing or contributing to such dis-
charge, release, or disposal, including but not limited to
(C) Following any apportionment under subparagraph (A) no person shall
be required to pay in excess of his apportioned share of the total costs described
in subsection (b).
3 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at 112-13.
79. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at xv.
80. Id.
81. Id. at xv-xvi.
82. Id. at xvi.
83. Id.
84. See Grad, supra note 30, at 6 (discussing the legislative history of The 1980 Act).
85. Id.
86. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at xviii.
87. Id.
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prior owners, lessees, and generators, transporters, or dispos-
ers of... hazardous substances .... 88
Section 2 defined the terms "owner or operator": "For purposes of
this Act (1) the terms * * * 'owner or operator' * * * shall have the
meaning provided in section 311 (a) of the Clean Water Act."89 The
only defenses to liability provided in Senate Bill 1480, as introduced,
were "an act of God or ... and act of war."90
Upon its introduction in the Senate onJuly 11, 1979, Senate Bill
1480 was referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Pub-
lic Works.9 One year later, onJuly 11, 1980, the Committee reported
out a revised version of the Bill.92 Although the definition of "owner
or operator" remained unchanged in the revised bill,93 the liability
provisions found in Section 4 differed. The revised bill imposed joint,
several, and strict liability upon:
(i) the owner or operator of a vessel or a facility,
(ii) any person who at the time of disposal of any haz-
ardous substance owned or operated any facility or site at
which such hazardous substances are disposed of,
(iii) any person who by contract, agreement, or other-
wise arranged for disposal, treatment, or transport for dispo-
sal or treatment by any other party or entity of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, at facilities or
sites owned or operated by such other party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(iv) any person who accepts any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites se-
lected by such person, from which a hazardous substance is
discharged, released, or disposed of, or from which any pol-
88. Id. at 200.
89. Id. at 30. When S. 1480 was introduced, the Clean Water Act provided the follow-
ing definition of "owner or operator":
"Owner or operator" means (A) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, oper-
ating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, and (B) in the case of an onshore
facility, and an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such onshore
facility or offshore facility, and (C) in the case of any abandoned offshore facility,
the person who owned or operated such facility immediately prior to such
abandonment[.]
Clean Water Act § 121 (a) (6), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (6) (1988). The Clean Water Act is also
referred to herein as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).
90. 3 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at 33.
91. Id. at 27.
92. See 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at xvii.
93. See id. at 27, 30.
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lutant or contaminant is released resulting in action under
section 3(c) (1) of this Act ....
Thus, although the Senate Committee added specific provisions im-
posing liability upon past owners and operators at the time of disposal
and upon transporters and generators, the Committee deleted the
language relating to liability for those "causing" or "contributing to"
or for those who "caused" or "contributed to" the release or threat of
a release of hazardous substances. 95
Especially relevant to the present inquiry is the fact that on Au-
gust 5, 1980, Senator Gravel introduced an amendment to Senate Bill
1480 (as reported) that would have exempted an owner "lessor" of a
"facility" from the definition of "owner or operator" if the owner-les-
sor did not participate in the management or control of the facility.96
The amendment defined the term "owner or operator" as
any person operating a vessel or facility or holding title to,
or, in the absence of title, any other indicia of ownership of,
a vessel or facility, but does not include a person who (either
singly or in combination with others) without participation in
the management or operation of a vessel or facility, leases or char-
ters to any other person with whom such person is not otherwise
affiliated, or holds such title or indicia of ownership primarily
to protect a security interest in, the vessel or facility, and, in
the case of any abandoned vessel or facility, the owner or
operator of such a vessel or facility immediately prior to its
abandonment. 97
The Gravel amendment was not considered by the Senate, 98 and on
October 1, 1980, the unamended version of Senate Bill 1480, as re-
ported to the Environment and Public Works Committee, was re-
ferred to the Senate Committee on Finance; the Committee on
Finance, without amendment or written report, reported the bill fa-
vorably back to the full Senate.99
Nevertheless, by November of 1980 it was clear that the Senate
would not adopt S. 1480.10' It also was clear that the Senate would not
94. Id. at 181 (mark-ups and italics omitted).
95. Id.
96. 126 CONG. REC. 21,377 (1980).
97. Id, at 21,378 (emphasis added).
98. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 225, at 27.
99. Id. at xviii.
100. Id.
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adopt either H.R. 85 or H.R. 7020, the House versions of the bill.''
Thus, " [i]n an effort to pass a bill during the waning hours of the 96th
Congress, two compromises were proposed." 112 The Senate deemed
the first compromise, known as the "Stafford Amendment," unaccept-
able and therefore did not formally consider it.103 The second com-
promise bill, known as the "Stafford-Randolph substitute," was more
acceptable and the Senate considered it on November 24, 1980.104
As amended by the Stafford-Randolph substitute, Section 107 of
Senate Bill 1480 contained liability provisions that were identical to
those found in Section 107 of The 1980 Act:10 5
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this
section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any haz-
ardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or other-
wise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of haz-
ardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by
another party or entity, and containing such hazardous sub-
stances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release,
or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of re-
sponse costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action in-
curred by the United States Government or a State not in-
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan; and
101. Id. See also Maloney, supra note 29, at 530 (observing that there was a "lame duck"
Congress following the 1980 elections and that this fact considerably altered the version of
CERCLA enacted).
102. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at xviii.
103. Id. at xix.
104. Id. at xx-xxi.
105. Id. at 167.
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(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing
such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.
(b) There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a
hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were
caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an em-
ployee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omis-
sion occurs in connection with a contractual relationship,
existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where
the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff
and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the
defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
(a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such
hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circum-
stances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that
could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs. 10 6
Similarly, subsection 101(20) of the Stafford-Randolph substitute,
which defined the terms "owner" and "operator," is identical to sub-
section 101(20) of The 1980 Act:1"7
(20) (A) "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a ves-
sel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise,
such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an off-
shore facility, any person owning or operating such facility,
and (iii) in the case of any abandoned facility, any person
who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at
such facility immediately prior to such abandonment. Such
term does not include a person, who, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the ves-
sel or facility.1" 8
106. The 1980 Act § 107(a) and (b), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) and
(b) (1988). The 1986 Amendments affected some of the language in § 107(a) of The 1980
Act. See CERCLA § 107(a), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) (1988).
107. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at 26.
108. The 1980 Act § 101 (20), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (1988).
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The Stafford-Randolph substitute bill deleted previous lan-
guage10 9 that had provided explicitly for joint, several, and strict liabil-
ity.110 Instead, the substitute bill utilized a new definition of "liability"
contained in Section 101 (32) of the final bill."' This section, which is
identical to Section 101(32) of The 1980 Act, provides: "'liable' or
'liability' under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard
of liability which obtains under section 311 of the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act." n2
The Senate debated the substitute bill following its introduc-
tion.1"' Senator Stafford described the Stafford-Randolph substitute
bill as "a combination of the best of the three other bills, and an elimi-
nation of the worst, or at least the most controversial [provisions] ."114
Senator Randolph pointed out that the definition of "liability" con-
tained in the substitute bill, which referred to Section 311 of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act, was to be interpreted as providing a
standard of strict liability.115 Similarly, Senator Dole stated: "It...
makes sense to incorporate a definition of strict liability that will serve
as a uniform standard in determining liability for cleanup and other
costs, and this has been achieved by reference to the Clean Water
Act."116 As Senator Mitchell summarized: "A party may... be held
strictly liable for the cleanup of chemical contaminants and natural
resource damage for which he is responsible."'
17
109. See, e.g., § 107 of The 1980 Act, quoted at 126 CONG. REC. 30,961-62 (1980).
110. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,972 (1980) (demonstrating that the substitute bill eliminated
joint and several liability and limited the scope of liability). See also id at 30,972-82 (con-
taining the text of the substitute bill).
111. Id. at 30,958.
112. The 1980 Act § 101(32), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988). See
also Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311(f) and (g), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0 and (g)
(1988) (establishing the standards for liability under the FWPCA).
113. 126 CONG. REc. 30,930 (1980).
114. Id. at 30,935.
115. Id. at 30,932. Sen. Randolph stated:
Unless otherwise provided in this act, the standard of liability is intended to be
the same as that provided in section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (33 U.S.C. 1321). I understand this to be a standard of strict liability.
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be
governed by traditional and evolving principles of common law. An example is
joint and several liability. Any reference to these terms has been deleted, and the
liability of joint tortfeasors will be determined under common or previous statu-
tory law.
As under section 311, due care or the absence of negligence with respect to a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance does not constitute a de-
fense under this act.
Id
116. Id. at 30,950.
117. Id. at 30,941.
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The Senate passed the Stafford-Randolph substitute bill, as modi-
fied by several minor amendments, 118 on November 24, 1980.119 Fol-
lowing the vote on Senate Bill 1480,120 the Senate discussed the
legislation further.1 2 1 At that time, Senator Helms, who had voted
against the legislation, 122 made the following statement:
It is very clear from the language of the Stafford-Randolph
substitute itself, from the legislative history, and from the lia-
bility provisions of section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, that now the Stafford-Randolph bill does not in
and of itself create joint and several liability. The Govern-
ment can sue a defendant under the bill only for those costs
and damages that it can prove were caused by the defend-
ant's conduct.1
21
Later in the floor debate, however, Senator Stafford directly contra-
dicted the statement of Senator Helms, reasserting that the standard
of liability under the enacted bill was to be interpreted as joint, sev-
eral, and strict.1 24
At the conclusion of the post-passage discussion relating to Sen-
ate Bill 1480 (as amended by the modified substitute), Senator Ran-
dolph asked that House Bill 7020 be amended by substituting the text
of Senate Bill 1480 (which had just been passed by the Senate) 125 for
the existing text of House Bill 7020.126 The substitute House Bill 7020
was then passed by the Senate with a voice vote on November 24,
1980.127 "The Senate version of H.R. 7020 was sent to the House
which took it up on December 3. "128 The House, faced with what
118. See id. at 30,956-70 (quoting the full text of Senate Bill 1480 as amended).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 30,970-72.
121. See id. at 30,970-87.
122. Id. at 30,955-96.
123. Id. at 30,972.
124. Id at 30,986. Sen. Stafford stated:
As reported by the committee, S. 1480 and its accompanying report set the stan-
dard of liability as one of joint, several, and strict liability. However, in order to
avoid confusion over new language the compromise bill simply defers to existing
law in section 311 of the Clean Water Act which already provides a liability stan-
dard for recovery of costs for response and remedial actions in preventing and
cleaning up releases or discharges of hazardous substances.
Id.
125. Id. at 30,956.
126. Id. at 30,987.
127. Id. The parliamentary maneuver of substituting the Senate Bill into the House Bill
and then passing the House Bill "apparently occurred because S. 1480 contained tax provi-
sions and, as a revenue bill, was required by the Constitution to originate in the House." 1
SUPERFUND, supra note 225, at xxi.
128. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at xxi.
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some representatives considered a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude on the
part of the Senate leadership, debated the bill without making
amendments. 129
In the House debate, referring to the substitute version of House
Bill 7020, Representative Florio stated that "[t]he standard of liability
in [the substitute bill] is intended to be the same as that provided in
section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act; that is, strict
liability."' 30 Florio continued: "Liability remains 'subject only to the
defenses' provided in the bill. That is, a defendant can escape liability
only if he establishes that the release or threatened release is caused
solely by an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third
party, with third parties being narrowly defined."13' Further, he ad-
ded, "Since reference to section 311 standards of liability is necessary
only where not superseded by standards of this bill, these defenses,
and not those of section 311, will control."" 2
Representative Broyhill, who voted against the substitute bill, 3'
argued that "the bill is unexcusably vague in terms of identifying who
should be liable and for what."134 In his opinion, based on the lan-
guage provided in Section 107 of the bill, "the owner or operator of a
vessel or a facility can be held strictly liable for various types of costs
and damages entirely on the basis of having been found to be an
owner or operator of any facility or vessel."' This is because, he said,
129. Id. Needham and Menefee state:
Several observers, and the debates, suggest that the Senate leadership felt that the
tenuous political coalition in the Senate would dissolve if the Senate had to con-
sider a subsequent, House amended version. Thus, the Senate leadership appar-
ently believed that any substantive amendments by the House would prove fatal to
the bill. Arguing that neither time nor politics permitted the use of a conference
committee to modify the bill, the Senate leadership even discouraged the adop-
tion of technical amendments by the House.
Id.
130. 126 CONG. REc. 31,965 (1980).
131. Id.
132. Id. In order to further "clarify" the standard of liability under the substitute bill,
Rep. Florio then introduced into the record an opinion letter from United States Assistant
Attorney General Parker regarding the existing liability standard under the Clean Water
Act. Id. at 31,966. Citing two cases for authority, Mr. Parker stated, "Caselaw construing
section 311 clearly indicates that not only are the defenses to be narrowly construed but
the plain meaning of the liability regime establishes a strict liability standard." Id. (citing
Burgess v. M/V Tomano, 564 F.2d 964, 982 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978)
(construing the "third-party defense" provided in Section 311 of the FWPCA narrowly) and
Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that
FWPCA Section 311 imposes strict liability)).
133. See 126 CONG. REc. 31,981 (1980).
134. Id. at 31,969.
135. Id.
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"[t]here is no [statutory] language requiring any causal conviction
[sic:connection] with a release of a hazardous substance."" 6 Finally,
Representative Harsha criticized the bill, stating that the judiciary
would "have a field day in ridiculing the Congress on passing laws that
are vague, internally inconsistent, and using tools such as superseding
laws which are in conflict without any further guidance. This bill is
not a superfund bill-it's a welfare and relief act for lawyers. "137
Nevertheless, the House passed the substituted form of House
Bill 7020 later in the day on December 3, 1980.138 Jimmy Carter, the
outgoing President of the United States, "signed the bill into law on
... December 11, 1980."'1"
B. The SARA Amendments of 1986
Congress amended The 1980 Act in 1986 by enacting the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA).140
Although SARA enacted a significant number of amendments to the
original 1980 legislation,' SARA made relatively few changes to the
liability provisions found in Section 107(a) and the related definitions
of "owner or operator" and "liability," which remain substantially the
same. 142 On the other hand, SARA made significant changes to the
liability defenses in Section 107(b) by adding a definition of the term
"contractual relationship."' 43 SARA also added a de minimis settle-
ment provision. 1
44
Crafting SARA was no simple matter. In fact, "[t]he three year
process leading to SARA's enactment began in 1984." 145 House Bill
2817 (the predecessor to House Bill 2005, which became the enacted
SARA legislation)' 46 was introduced on June 20, 1985,147 and was re-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 31,970.
138. See id. at 31,981.
139. 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at xxi.
140. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 to 9675 (1988)) (as noted supra note
2, this act is referred to in its entirety herein as "SARA," and as "CERCLA" when referring
to The 1980 Act as amended by SARA).
141. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, SUPERFUND DESKBOOK (1986) (hereinafter
"DESKBOoK") (presenting an overview of The 1986 Amendments contained in SARA).
142. Compare § 107(a) of The 1980 Act, quoted supra text accompanying note 106, with
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
143. Compare § 107(b) of The 1980 Act, quoted supra text accompanying note 106, with
CERCLA § 101 (35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988).
144. See CERCLA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1988).
145. DESKBOOK, supra note 141, at 5.
146. See generally id. at 5, 6 (noting that the House floor debate of December 5, 6 and 10
of 1985 was on H.R. 2817, but that after that the House passed a Conference version,
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ferred to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Ways and
Means, and Public Works and Transportation.148 After the Commit-
tee on Energy and Commerce reported H.R. 2817 on August 1, 1985,
the bill was referred to the Committees on the Judiciary and Merchant
Marine and Fisheries.149 Because the various House committees had
reported out somewhat different versions of House Bill 2817, a com-
promise version was developed. 5 0 It was at this point that Section
122(g) (1) and (2) was added to the compromise bill, permitting the
administrator of the EPA to enter into de minimis settlement
agreements with "innocent" or "almost innocent" landowners who
satisfied the stated criteria.15 ' The House version of Section 12 2 (g)
designated H.R. 2005, reconciling positions taken in the floor debate and Committee re-
ports. H.R. 2005 was signed into law as SARA on October 17, 1986). See also infra text
accompanying notes 173-176.
147. 131 CONG. REC. 16,581 (1985).
148. Id at 34,633.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 34,639.
151. Id. at 34,705. The text of the de minimis provision found in the H.R. 2817 "com-
promise bill" is as follows:
(g) De Minimis Settlements.-
(1) Expedited Final Settlement.-Whenever practicable and in the public inter-
est, as determined by the Administrator, the Administrator shall as promptly as
possible reach a final settlement with a potentially responsible party in an admin-
istrative or civil action under section 106 or 107 if such settlement involves only a
minor portion of the response costs at the facility concerned and, in the judg-
ment of the Administrator, the conditions in either of the following subpara-
graph (A) or (B) are met:
(A) Both of the following are minimal in comparison to other hazardous
substances at the facility:
(i) The amount of the hazardous substances contributed by that party to
the facility.
(ii) The toxic or other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by
that party to the facility.
(B) The potentially responsible party-
(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility is located;
(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treat-
ment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility; and
(iii) did not contribute to the release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance at the facility through any action or omission.
This subparagraph does not apply if the potentially responsible party
purchased the real property with actual or constructive knowledge that the prop-
erty was used for the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of
any hazardous substance.
(2) Release From Liability. The Administrator may provide a covenant not to sue
with respect to the facility concerned, or grant a release from liability with respect
to the facility concerned, to any party who has entered into a settlement under
this subsection unless such a covenant or release would be inconsistent with the
public interest as determined under subsection (f).
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substantially paralleled the bill that eventually was enacted into
law. 15
2
On December 5, 1985, the House resolved itself into a "Commit-
tee of the Whole" and began considering amendments to the House
Bill 2817 "compromise bill."' During the floor debate, Representa-
tive Packard sought to clarify the intent of the de minimis settlement
provision."5 Referring to "landowners whose participation is limited
to ownership of the fee title to or equity interest in the property on
which a toxic-generating or disposal facility is located and who have
no management control over activities at the facility giving rise to a
response action,"' 55 Representative Packard stated:
[T] he [Public Works C] ommittee believes it to be inequitable
to consider such noncontributory parties as owners or opera-
tors of a facility[.] Finally, I would hope that the understand-
ing which came out of our informal discussions leads the
committee to expect the administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency to actively utilize his authority under this
act to enter into de minimis final settlements and grant re-
leases from liability to eligible potentially responsible
parties.
56
Representative Roe, responding to Representative Packard, stated,
"The gentleman's statements do, indeed, reflect the committee's posi-
tion on this point."'5
7
Immediately following the exchange between Representatives
Packard and Roe, Representative Frank saw the opportunity to pro-
pose the following amendment to Section 107 of The 1980 Act, creat-
ing an "innocent landowner defense:" '
(m) Landowner Liability-There shall be no liability under
subsection (a) (1) of this section for a person otherwise liable
who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
he-
Id.
152. Compare the text quoted supra note 15151 with CERCLA § 122(g) (1) and (2), 42
U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) and (2) (1988).
153. 131 CONG. REC. 34,632 (1985).
154. See id. at 34,715 (questioning whether he is correct in assuming that landowners
who do not participate in the management of a facility are considered not to be owners or
operators for purposes of liability).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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(1) is the owner of the real property on or in which the
facility is located;
(2) did not conduct or permit the generation, transpor-
tation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance at the facility, the release or threatened release of
which causes the incurrence of a response cost;
(3) did not contribute to the release or threat of release
of a hazardous substance at the facility through any act or
omission; and
(4) did not acquire the property with actual or con-
structive knowledge that the property was used prior to the
acquisition for the generation, transportation, storage, treat-
ment, or disposal of any hazardous substance. 159
During consideration of the Frank amendment, Representative
Breaux inquired as to the existing state of the law with respect to the
CERCLA liability of a purchaser of contaminated property.16 ° Repre-
sentative Frank responded that the answer was unclear,' 6 ' but that he
thought "all of us would agree that you should not be held responsi-
ble. I would hope that frankly even under the current law you might
ultimately be held not responsible, but no one can have that
assurance."'1
62
Representative Eckart then proposed a modification of the Frank
amendment that would have removed the language "the release or
threatened release which causes the incurrence of a response cost"
from subparagraph (2).16' Representative Frank responded: "[A]s I
understand [it, the] concern is [with] the part in paragraph 2 which
says 'the release or threatened release of which causes the incurrence
of a response cost.' I understand that concern. On the other hand, I
would not be satisfied if you would strike that altogether.""6 Repre-
159. Id.
160. I& Rep. Breaux asked:
Without the gentleman's amendment, am I to understand that a person
would be able to buy property, a tract of land and have in the deed of conveyance
a covenant that this property is transferred and there is no toxic waste located on
this property, there is no way that person can visually find out or reasonably know
that there is any kind of toxic waste underneath that property; and then 5 years or
some time period down the road discover [sic] for the first time that that property
has some toxic wastes that had been buried years before under his property, that
without the gentleman from Massachusett's [sic] amendment that that property
owner would then be somehow held responsible?
Id.
161. I.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 34,716.
164. Id. at 34,717.
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sentative Eckart argued that any "innocent landowner" amendment
should be narrowly drawn.165 Concluding that perhaps they might be
unable to reach an agreement, Representative Frank asserted that it
was a "pro-Superfund" policy that purely innocent landowners not be
held liable for releases of hazardous waste in which they have not
been involved.166 Representative Eckart replied that the better solu-
tion would be to let the de minimis settlement provision take care of
the problem of the potential liability of "innocent" landowners.167 In
response, Representative Glickman pointed out that utilizing the de
minimis provision would not enable an "innocent" landowner to avoid
being involved in litigation.' 68 Representative Eckart then proposed
165. Id Rep. Eckart stated:
I would rather err on the side of being conservative, that there will be as few
releases as possible in the innocent landowner provisions, erring on the side of
maximizing the environmental protection and limiting the use of this landowner
liability because I think there will be greater protection to the health and
environment.
Id.
166. Id. See supra text accompanying note 159 (quoting the text of the Frank amend-
ment, at subparagraph (in) (2)). Rep. Frank stated:
It looks like we may not be able to reach agreement. I agree that we should
err on the side, if we err at all, of conservatism in this regard. I think this is
already fairly conservatively drafted. If we simply struck altogether what the gen-
tleman is proposing, we would have no amendment left at all, because if you
disturb anything at all, you would have a serious problem and you would lose the
benefit of this amendment. I think it is pro-Superfund to see that purely inno-
cent people are not swept up under the restrictive provisions.
Id.
167. Id. Rep. Eckart stated:
I would just say that I have a particular problem with the amendment. I think it
poses a dangerous erosion in the joint and several liabilities section. There is a
difference, a dramatic difference, between providing for a pre-suit position before
there is an establishment of liability under the de minimis settlement provision,
which restates this language, as opposed to creating an affirmative defense in the
strict joint and several liabilities area.
The problem, very simply, I submit to the Members of the Committee, is that
there are probably only a few, very narrow set of circumstances-two, I am ad-
vised-to which this could apply. I am not prepared at this point in time to pass a
single, very narrow, special interest escape clause to a very important, strict joint
and several liabilities provision that I think needs to be in place, given the fact I
think this measure is covered under subparagraph (g), under de minimis settle-
ments, the PRP could do it.
Id.
168. Id. at 34,718. Rep. Glickman stated:
Now, what Mr. Eckart said has some truth. He said that the de minimis provi-
sions in the bill, that it, allowing a release for a de minimis generator, a small
generator would take care of this particular case.
The problem is, it does not really take care of it because you are in the litiga-
tion, and then you would have to be settled out of the litigation. This offers a
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an alternative modification to the Frank amendment: 69 "I ask unani-
mous consent to change the amendment in lines 10 and 11 by striking
the expression 'the incurrence of a response cost,' and replace it with
'significant environmental hazard[.]"" 70 Frank accepted the second
proposed modification, stating, "I would hope we could go ahead with
that kind of language, with the understanding that it is always hard to
work things out exactly here. When we get to conference, maybe that
has to be perfected some way."171 The Frank amendment, as modi-
fied, was accepted by the Committee of the Whole. 7 '
The House of Representatives passed House Bill 2817, which in-
cluded the modified Frank amendment, five days later, on December
10, 1985.17' The House immediately amended House Bill 2005, the
"Superfund" bill that the Senate previously had passed and sent to the
House, 1 74 by substituting the text of House Bill 2817 for the Senate
title and text.175 The final version of House Bill 2005 then was sent to
the Conference Committee. 176
defense with somebody who is truly an innocent bystander, and that is the differ-
ence between utilizing that methodology and this one.
Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Subparagraph (2) of the Frank amendment, as modified, would then have pro-
vided: "(2) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treatment,
or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility, the release or threatened release of
which causes significant environmental hazard[.]" Id. at 34,719. Compare id. wuith id. at
34,715 (quoting the full text of the original Frank amendment, also quoted supra text
accompanying note 159).
171. Id. at 34,718. Rep. Frank concluded his remarks by stating, "I am confident that if
we adopt [my amendment] with this language change we will go to conference and adopt
language that will serve all of our purposes, so I hope it is accepted." Id. at 34,719.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 35,658.
174. During September 17-24, 1985, the Senate considered its Superfund bill. See 131
CONG. Rxc. 23,983-84, 24,755-56 (1985). Prior to voting on the bill, designated S. 51, how-
ever, the Senate voted to instruct the Senate Finance Committee to cease its consideration
of a social security bill, designated H.R. 2005, which had originated in the House. See id. at
24,756 (statement of Sen. Packwood requesting and receiving unanimous consent to dis-
charge the Finance Committee's consideration of H.R. 2005). At the same time, the Sen-
ate voted to consider H.R. 2005, substituting the original House title and text with the title
and text of S. 51, as amended. Id. The Senate then passed its Superfund bill, now desig-
nated H.R. 2005, and sent it to the House for consideration. Id. at 25,090. As in the case
of the 1980 legislation, apparently this procedural maneuver was performed so that the
bill, which contained funding provisions, would be deemed to have "originated" in the
House. See supra note 127.
175. 131 CONG. REc. 35,658, 35,738 (1985).
176. Id. at 35,658 (containing a request by Rep. Dingell to have the House and Senate
confer on H.R. 2005).
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The Conference Committee, however, declined to adopt the
Frank amendment to Section 107 as contained in House Bill 2817.177
Instead, the Committee developed a similar provision in which it cre-
ated a separate definition of the term "contractual relationship." '78
Although The 1980 Act had employed the term "contractual relation-
ship" in the "third-party defense" language found in Section
107(b) (3), that term was not otherwise defined in the 1980 legisla-
tion.179 The text of the new definition contained in the Conference
Report is identical with that found in SARA, as enacted, and reads as
follows:
(35) (A) The term "contractual relationship," for the pur-
pose of section 9607(b) (3) of this title, includes, but is not
limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments trans-
ferring tide or possession, unless the real property on which
the facility concerned is located was acquired by the defend-
ant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous sub-
stance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of the
circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also es-
tablished by the defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the
defendant did not know and had no reason to know that
any hazardous substance which is the subject of the re-
lease or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at
the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which ac-
quired the facility by escheat, or through any other in-
voluntary transfer or acquisition, or through the
exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or
condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance
or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant
must establish that he has satisfied the requirements of sec-
tion 9607(b) (3) (a) and (b) of this title.
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to
know, as provided in clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at the time
of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous own-
177. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186, (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3279.
178. Id.
179. See generally The 1980 Act § 101, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988)
(containing the terms defined in The 1980 Act).
186 [VOL. 53:157
LANDOWNER-LESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
ership and uses of the property consistent with good com-
mercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize
liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court
shall take into account any specialized knowledge or experi-
ence on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the
purchase price to the value of the property if uncontami-
nated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable infor-
mation about the property, the obviousness of the presence
or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the
ability to detect such contamination by appropriate
inspection.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b) (3)
of this title shall diminish the liability of any previous owner
or operator of such facility who would otherwise be liable
under this chapter. Notwithstanding this paragraph, if the
defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility
when the defendant owned the real property and then subse-
quently transferred ownership of the property to another
person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant
shall be treated as liable under section 9607(a) (1) of this ti-
tle and no defense under section 9607(b) (3) of this title
shall be available to such defendant.
(D) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the liability
under this chapter of a defendant who, by any act or omis-
sion, caused or contributed to the release or threatened re-
lease of a hazardous substance which is the subject of the
action relating to the facility.' 8 °
The Conference Report that accompanied the compromise con-
ference bill explained the final version of Section 101(35) and dis-
cussed that section's relationship with Section 107(b)(3).181 The
180. CERCLA § 101 (35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988).
181. The Conference Report provided, in pertinent part:
[The] new definition of contractual relationship is intended to clarify and confirm
that under limited circumstances landowners who acquire property without know-
ing of any contamination at the site and without reason to know of any contami-
nation (or as otherwise noted in the amendment) may have a defense to liability
under section 107 and therefore should not be held liable for cleaning up the site
if such persons satisfy the remaining requirements of section 107(b) (3). A per-
son who acquires property through a land contract or deed or other instrument
transferring title or possession that meets the requirements of this definition may
assert that an act or omission of a third party should not be considered to have
occurred in connection with a contractual relationship as identified in section
107(b) and therefore is not a bar to the defense.
In the limited circumstances identified in this definition, such landowners
are entitled to the defense if they exercise the requisite due care upon learning of
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Conference Committee comments do not suggest an intent otherwise
to expand or narrow the availability of the "third-party defense" be-
yond the specific "innocent" purchaser situation.
The Conference Committee also adopted the de minimis settle-
ment language from Section 122(g) (1) and (2) of the House Bill 1 2 in
a substantially similar form."'3 Section 122(g) (1) and (2), as enacted,
provides:
(g) DE MINIMIS SETTLEMENTS
(1) EXPEDITED FINAL SETTLEMENT
Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as de-
termined by the President, the President shall as promptly as
possible reach a final settlement with a potentially responsi-
ble party in an administrative or civil action under section
9606 or 9607 of this title if such settlement involves only a
minor portion of the response costs at the facility concerned
and, in the judgment of the President, the conditions in
either of the following subparagraph (A) or (B) are met:
(A) Both of the following are minimal in comparison to
other hazardous substances at the facility:
(i) The amount of the hazardous substances contrib-
uted by that party to the facility.
(ii) The toxic or other hazardous effects of the sub-
stances contributed by that party to the facility.
(B) The potentially responsible party-
(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the
facility is located;
such release or threat of release. For example, where the release or threat of
release is caused by an act of vandalism, the landowner may be able to assert the
defense where he exercises due care and takes satisfactory precautions against
foreseeable acts as discussed below.
The Conferees recognize that the due care requirement embodied in section
107(b) (3) only requires such person to exercise that degree of due care which is
reasonable under the circumstances. The requirement would include those steps
necessary to protect the public from a health or environmental threat. Finally,
the precautions against foreseeable acts of third parties requirement of section
107(b) (3) (b) does not prevent a subsequent purchaser after contamination has
occurred from claiming the defense, but only comes into play after the land-
owner acquires the property. Foreseeability must be considered in light of the
specific circumstances of each case. The provisions of section 101(35) (B) as to
"reason to know" govern the purchaser's responsibility with regard to acts of third
parties to the purchase.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186-87 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3276, 3279-80.
182. See supra note 151 (quoting the de minimis language in H.R. 2817).
183. Compare the enacted language, quoted infra text accompanying note 169, with the
text quoted supra note 151.
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(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, trans-
portation, storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous
substance at the facility; and
(iii) did not contribute to the release or threat of re-
lease of a hazardous substance at the facility through any ac-
tion or omission.
This subparagraph (B) does not apply if the potentially
responsible party purchased the real property with actual or
constructive knowledge that the property was used for the
generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal of
any hazardous substance.
(2) COVENANT NOT TO SUE
The President may provide a covenant not to sue with
respect to the facility concerned to any party who has en-
tered into a settlement under this subsection unless such a
covenant would be inconsistent with the public interest as
determined under subsection (f) of this section.1 8 4
184. CERCLA § 122(g) (1) and (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) and (2) (1988). SARA also
changed some language in § 107(a). Section 107(a), as amended, provides:
(a) ...
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dispo-
sal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes
the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national con-
tingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss result-
ing from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
The amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include inter-
est on the amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D). Such in-
terest shall accrue from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is
demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the expenditure concerned. The rate of
interest on the outstanding unpaid balance of the amounts recoverable under
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According to one commentator, "[t]he presence of both the 'in-
nocent landowner' defense and the de minimis landowner-settlement
provisions in CERCLA is something of a fluke." i"5 Apparently, "EPA
originally advocated the de minimis provision in several House com-
mittees during the SARA reauthorization process to forestall inclusion
of an additional defense to liability."' 86 Although the House "acceded
to EPA's approach," during the floor debate the House also adopted
the modified Frank amendment, thus adding the "innocent land-
owner" defense without removing from the legislation the de minimis
alternative.18 7
The Senate passed the Conference Committee version of SARA
on October 3, 1986.188 The House passed it on October 8, 1986.189
Thus, in modified form, the House versions of the "innocent land-
owner" defense and the de minimis settlement provision were incor-
porated into CERCILA. 19 °
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND CASE LAW
As stated in the Introduction, the scope of this Article is limited
to the important but circumscribed topic of a landowner-lessor's lia-
bility under CERCLA for response costs associated with the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances caused by the act or omis-
sion of a tenant in possession. Before proceeding with a discussion of
liability under Section 107(a), let us assume the following
hypothetical:
In 1987, Larry Landlord purchased Brownacre and its
accompanying buildings for cash from Samantha Seller. At
the time of the purchase, Larry Landlord had a "due dili-
gence" survey conducted, which concluded that no hazard-
ous substances were present on or in the land. After taking
title, Landlord leased the property for five years to Terry
this section shall be the same rate as is specified for interest on investments of the
Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98 of
title 26. For purposes of applying such amendments to interest under this subsec-
tion, the term "comparable maturity" shall be determined with reference to the
date on which interest accruing under this subsection commences.
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
185. LIGHT, supra note 11, at 221.
186. Id.
187. See id. See also supra text accompanying note 173.
188. 132 CONG. REc. 28,456 (1986).
189. Id. at 29,790.
190. LIGHT, supra note 11, at 221.
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Tenant. Under the lease terms, Tenant is responsible for
maintaining the leased premises; thus, Landlord has no con-
tact with Tenant other than receiving the rent check in the
mail each month. The lease places no restriction upon Ten-
ant's use of the property.
During the lease term, Tenant utilizes the main building
located on Brownacre for manufacturing processes. These
processes involve the use of chemical solvents, which after
use, are discarded as waste. The wastes are placed in fifty-five
gallon drums and stored for extended periods of time in a
smaller storage building located on the rear of the property.
After being stored for approximately two years, the
drums begin to deteriorate and the solvents begin to seep
into the ground through cracks in the concrete floor. The
State becomes aware of the problem, incurs response costs
for clean-up activities, and brings an action under CERCLA
against Larry Landlord and Terry Tenant. Terry Tenant has
minimal assets available to pay any damage award that is im-
posed by a court.
Given the above hypothetical, the question is, broadly speaking,
whether the landowner-lessor is liable under CERCLA for damages
relating to the response costs incurred by the State. Pursuant to CER-
CIA Section 107(a), "covered persons" can be held liable for "re-
sponse costs" when there has been a "release" or "threatened release"
of "hazardous substances" into the environment. 91 In the above hy-
pothetical, let us assume that the statutory definitions found in CER-
CLA relating to "facility," 92 "hazardous substances,"193 "release," 194
and "response costs"'95 have been satisfied.
The first issue to consider is simply whether or not Larry Land-
lord is a "covered person" pursuant to Section 107(a) (1) and (2).196
As mentioned previously, 197 the terms "owner" and "operator" are suc-
cinctly defined in Section 101 (20) to mean those who "own" or "oper-
ate."' 9 ' In the hypothetical, Larry Landlord held legal title to the
property when the State commenced the lawsuit; therefore, it seems
191. SeeCERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See also supra note 184 (quoting
the amended version of Section 107(a)).
192. See CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988) (defining "facility").
193. See id. § 9601(14) (defining "hazardous substance").
194. See id. § 9601(22) (defining "release").
195. See supra note 11 (discussing response costs).
196. See CERCIA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See also supra note 184 (quoting
the amended version of Section 107(a)).
197. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
198. See CERCLA § 101 (20), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (1988).
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clear that Landlord would be considered a current "owner" for pur-
poses of Section 107 (a) (1).
Assuming that Larry Landlord is considered an "owner" and that
all of the other previously mentioned 99 statutory elements are satis-
fied, a prima facie case for liability under Section 107(a) has been
met.200 Nevertheless, "passive" landowner-lessors have argued in de-
fense of suits to recover CERCLA response costs that they should not
be held liable under Section 107(a). For example, in New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 201 the defendant landowner-lessor argued that liability
could not be imposed upon it as a current "owner" under Section
107(a) (1) unless "causation" for the "release" could be attributed to
it.20 2 In support of this "innocent landlord defense," the landowner-
lessor apparently cited the statements of Representative Gore during
the House debates relating to a "causation" requirement. 205  Never-
theless, the Shore court rejected the argument that Section 107(a) (1)
contains a causation requirement, stating that "section [107(a) (1)] un-
equivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility
from which there is a release or threat of release, without regard to
causation. 20 4
The Shore court noted that the comments of Representative Gore
were inapposite because they referred to House Bill 7020 (as modified
by the Gore amendments) ,20 rather than to the Stafford-Randolph
substitute language for House Bill 7020, which was passed by both
houses. 206 The court also pointed out that Representative Broyhill
had opposed the Stafford-Randolph substitute to House Bill 7020, in
part, because he believed that an "owner" could be held strictly liable
on the basis of ownership, without regard to causation.2 0 7 The Shore
court discounted Senator Helms's remarks to the contrary.20 8
199. See supra text accompanying notes 192-195.
200. See also infra text accompanying note 253 (delineating the elements of the possible
"third-party defense"). See generally infra text accompanying notes 226-357 (analyzing
"third-party defense" to CERCLA liability).
201. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
202. Id. at 1043.
203. Id. at 1045. See also 126 CONG. REc. 26,786-87 (1980) (containing the remarks of
Rep. Gore during the House debate, quoted supra text accompanying notes 70-74).
204. Shore, 759 F.2d at 1044.
205. Id. at 1044-45. See also 126 CONG. REc. 26,798-99 (1980) (containing the text of
§ 3071 (a) of H.R. 7020, as amended, quoted supra note 78).
206. Shore, 759 F.2d at 1044-45. See also 126 CONG. REC. 31,981 (1980) (containing the
text of The 1980 Act § 107(a), quoted supra text accompanying note 106).
207. See Shore, 759 F.2d at 1045 n.19. See also 126 CONG. REc. 31,969 (1980) (containing
the remarks of Sen. Broyhill, quoted supra text accompanying notes 134-136).
208. Shore, 759 F.2d at 1045 n.19. See also 126 CONG. REC. 30,972 (1980) (containing the
remarks of Sen. Helms, quoted supra text accompanying note 123).
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Similarly, in United States v. Monsanto Co.,2° the landowner-lessors
attempted to assert an "innocent landlord defense" to alleged CER-
CLA liability arising from their status as past "owners" at the time of
disposal, pursuant to Section 107(a) (2) .21' The Monsanto court
adopted the strict liability interpretation of Section 107 (a): "We agree
with the overwhelming body of precedent that has interpreted section
107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme."211 Applying this stan-
dard to the landowner-lessors, the Monsanto court stated:
In light of the strict liability imposed by section 107(a),
we cannot agree with the site-owners [sic] contention that
they are not within the class of owners Congress intended to
hold liable. The traditional elements of tort culpability on
which the site-owners rely simply are absent from the
statute.212
The Shore and Monsanto courts' interpretation of Section 107(a)
as creating strict landowner-lessor liability is sound for several reasons.
Both the statutory language and the legislative history cited by the
Shore court provide reasonable bases for the courts' interpretation. As
the Shore court pointed out, the remarks of Representative Gore were
made in relation to the "caused or contributed/causing or contribut-
ing" liability language found in House Bill 7020 (as modified by the
Gore amendments), 2 13 rather than to the finally enacted version of
House Bill 7020, which contained substantially different liability
language.214
Moreover, in the context of landowner-lessor liability, if one were
to consider remarks made in relation to earlier versions of House Bill
7020, then the remarks of Representative Martin (a supporter of the
bill) also should be considered.21 5 Martin's statements suggest that he
believed the version of House Bill 7020 originally reported out of
committee to the House 21 1 would or should hold absentee landowner-
lessors responsible for response costs associated with wastes dumped
209. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
210. Id. at 166.
211. Id. at 167.
212. Id. at 168.
213. Shore, 759 F.2d at 1044-45. See also supra text accompanying note 78.
214. See Shore, 759 F.2d at 1044-45 (comparing 126 CONG. Rc. 26,786-87 (1980) (con-
taining remarks of Rep. Gore) with 126 CONG. REc. 31,981-82 (1980) (containing the com-
promise version)). See also supra text accompanying note 105 (discussing the different
versions).
215. See 126 CONG. REc. 26,768-69 (1980).
216. See supra note 41 (containing the text of H.R. 7020 as reported out of committee).
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by their tenants.217 It also would seem that the contradictory remarks
of Senator Helms, positing a causation requirement, should not be
accorded any great weight for several similar reasons: (1) the remarks
were made after the bill had passed the Senate; (2) the remarks were
made just after he had voted against the bill; and, (3) the remarks
were immediately contradicted by Senator Stafford, one of the bill's
sponsors. 2 "8 Finally, the Shore and Monsanto courts' conclusion that
Section 107(a) does not provide an "innocent landlord defense" finds
further support in the fact that an express exemption from the defini-
tion of "owner" for landowner-lessors that were "not otherwise partici-
pating in the management or control" of a facility was offered or
considered in both houses,2 "9 but never became part of The 1980
Act.220
Having discussed the landowner-lessor as an "owner" and as a po-
tentially "covered person" under Section 107(a), this Article next ex-
amines the Section 107(b) (3) "third-party defense." Before
proceeding with that discussion, however, let us consider the follow-
ing hypothetical:
Rose Realty is in the business of leasing commercial real
estate. Realty leases Blackacre to Paul Proprietor for use as a
retail clothing store for a term of five years. The leased
premises consists of a main store building and a smaller stor-
age building in the back of the lot.
The lease restricts the use of Blackacre to that of a retail
clothing store. It prohibits both illegal activity and the stor-
age of hazardous substances on the leased premises. It also
grants the landlord the right of periodic inspection to ensure
compliance with the terms of the lease. The landlord cove-
nants in the lease that it will maintain the premises in a con-
dition suitable to their intended purpose under the lease.
The lease permits the landlord to have the necessary access
to the leased premises to comply with its duty to keep the
premises in repair. Rose Realty has the power to evict Paul
Proprietor for any breach of the lease covenants.
217. See 126 CONG. REc. 26,769 (1980) (quoting the remarks of Rep. Martin). See also
supra text accompanying note 50.
218. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,986 (1980) (quoting the remarks of Sen. Stafford). See also
supra note 124.
219. See 1 SUPERFUND, supra note 25, at 31 (setting forth Section 101 of H.R. 85 as passed
by the House, which contained the exemption); 126 CONG. REc. 21,378 (1980) (containing
the Senate's consideration of such an exemption).
220. See generally The 1980 Act § 107, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988)
(containing no such liability exemption).
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The tenant, Paul Proprietor, also owns a landscaping
company and purchases several thousand gallons of herbi-
cides at a liquidation sale at a very cheap price for his land-
scaping company. Proprietor decides to store the fifty-five
gallon drums of herbicides, sixty in all, in the small storage
building located in the rear of Blackacre. Proprietor hopes
that eventually he will either be able to use the chemicals or
resell the drums at a profit.
Six months after being placed in storage on Blackacre,
the drums begin to corrode and the herbicide contained in
the drums starts to seep into the ground through cracks in
the concrete. The herbicide begins migrating toward a pond
located adjacent to Blackacre. Proprietor has minimal assets
to pay any court-imposed response costs.
Initially, let us assume that the statutory requirements relating to
"release,"221 "hazardous substance,"222 "facility,"223 and "owner,"224
have been met, and that the contamination problem will be discov-
ered and "response costs" 225 ultimately will be incurred. Broadly
speaking, the question is whether Rose Realty will succeed in asserting
the "third-party defense" provided in Section 107(b), and thereby
avoid liability.
Section 107(b) permits a defendant to assert certain defenses to
what otherwise would be strict liability for the release of hazardous
substances. 22 6 To assert the defense under the language of Section
107(b) (3), a defendant would have to prove the following: (1) that
the release or threatened release in question was caused solely by a
third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, and by a
third party other than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship existing directly, or indirectly, with the
defendant; (2) that the defendant exercised due care with respect to
the hazardous substance(s); and (3) that the defendant took precau-
tions in relation to foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party.227
Section 101(35) of CERCLA as amended defines the term "contrac-
tual relationship" to include relationships resulting from an instru-
221. See CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988) (defining "release").
222. See id. § 9601(14) (defining "hazardous substance").
223. See id, § 9601(9) (defining "facility").
224. See id. § 9601(20) (defining "owner"). See also supra text accompanying notes 197-
220 (discussing the "owner" designation in the landowner-lessor context).
225. See supra note 11 (discussing response costs).
226. See CERCIA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 106.
227. See id. § 9607(b) (3).
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ment "granting possession" unless the landowner meets certain
criteria for innocence.228
Certain questions, therefore, are relevant to the hypothetical in-
volving Rose Realty: (1) Does the lease agreement between Rose Re-
alty and Paul Proprietor constitute a "contractual relationship" for
purposes of Section 107(b) (3)? (2) Assuming that the lease does con-
stitute a "contractual relationship," and assuming that an "act or omis-
sion" of Proprietor caused the "release," did the act or omission of
Paul Proprietor occur "in connection with" the lease relationship?
Several cases in which the defendant has asserted the "third-party de-
fense" are relevant to these inquiries.
The court in United States v. Argent Corp. 229 applied pre-SARA stat-
utory language to determine the defendant's liability for the release of
hazardous substances. That case involved the lease of a warehouse to
a tenant who "operated a business utilizing hazardous chemicals to
recover silver from used film" on the leased premises. 2 0 The defend-
ant landowner-lessor had no connection with the tenant's business
other than through the leasehold relationship. 231 A "release" of haz-
ardous substances occurred on the leased property during the term of
the tenancy;2 12 the landowner-lessor asserted that the release was
caused "solely by an act or omission" of the tenant.23 Thus, the land-
owner-lessor argued that he was not liable for response costs because
he was protected by the "third-party defense" in Section 107(b) (3).234
The Argent court disagreed, finding that Section 107(b) (3) provided a
defense only when the act or omission of the third party did not take
place "in connection with a contractual relationship" with the defend-
ant landowner-lessor. 2 5 The court held that because the lease agree-
ment created a "contractual link" between the landowner-lessor and
228. See CERCLA § 101 (35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 180 (quoting CERCLA § 101(35)). Section 101(35) has been interpreted by the
courts as providing an "innocent landowner defense" for those persons who exercise the
requisite due diligence when acquiring property, and who otherwise meet the statutory
requirements provided in 101 (35) and 107(b). See, e.g., United States v. Pacific Hide and
Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1341, 1346-49 (D. Idaho 1989) (applying the language of
§ 101 (35)).
229. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1984).
230. Id. at 1355.
231. Id.
232. Id
233. Id. at 1356.
234. Id. See also The 1980 Act § 107(b) (3), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b) (3) (1988) (setting forth the asserted defense).
235. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1356. Thus, the defense was unavailable because
there was a lease agreement between defendant and the third party. Id.
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the tenant, the defendant could not establish a "third-party defense"
"as a matter of law." 23 6
Similarly, in United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal,
Inc.,2 31 the defendant landowners-lessors entered into an oral lease
with the defendant-tenant Columbia Organic Chemical Company,23 8
which purportedly intended to use the property for the "storage of
raw chemicals and materials used in [the tenant's] manufacturing
processes."23 9 Approximately one year after COCC entered into pos-
session under the lease, several people associated with the tenant be-
gan storing hazardous substances on the leased premises "as part of a
waste brokering and recycling operation."240 Several years later, in
early 1974, these people formed a corporation named South Carolina
Recycling and Disposal, Inc. and "continued hazardous waste opera-
tions at the site under auspices of the corporation [SCRDI]."241
"SCRDI occupied part of the site from the years 1976 to 1978, and it
assumed the verbal lease [as a tenant] in 1978."242 SCRDI continued
its hazardous waste operations on the leased premises through
1980.243 During that time, many of the drums that SCRDI had stored
at the site began to deteriorate and leak, resulting in a "release," a
cleanup, and the incursion of CERCLA response costs. 2 4 4
Utilizing pre-SARA statutory language, the defendant landowner-
lessors argued that they were covered under the Section 107(b) (3)
"third-party defense" because they were "ignorant of all waste disposal
activities,"2 45 and had never inspected the site during the relevant
time period. 246 The trial court rejected this argument, stating that
"[b]ecause there is no question of the contractual link between the
landowners and SCRDI, whose liability is admitted, the landowners
cannot under any circumstances prove that the release was caused
236. Id.
237. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858
F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
238. See South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. at 990. The tenant in this
case, Columbia Organic Chemical Company, is referred to herein as "COCC."
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. The defendant, South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., is referred to
herein as "SCRDI."
242. Id.
243. See Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 164.
244. See South Carolina Recycling & Disposa Inc., 653 F. Supp. at 990-91.
245. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 169.
246. Id.
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solely by a third party which did not share a contractual relationship
with them."
24 7
Finally, in United States v. Northernaire Plating Co.,2 48 the tenant op-
erated an electroplating business on the leased premises under a ten
year lease. 24 9 At the end of the lease term "significant amounts of
hazardous substances customarily used in electroplating" were found
to be contaminating the soil of the leased premises,20 and response
costs were incurred in relation to that "release" or "threatened re-
lease" on the premises.25 ' Employing the pre-SARA statutory lan-
guage, the defendant landowner-lessor apparently argued that it was
shielded from liability by the "third-party defense" under Section
107(b) (3).25 The court described the elements the defendant must
establish in order to use that defense:
(1) that a third party was the sole cause of the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance; (2) that the act
or omission of the third party causing the release did not
occur in the context of a contractual relationship existing
directly or indirectly with the defendant; and (3) that the
defendant took due care and precautions to prevent the
foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party causing the
release or threatened release.2 53
247. South Carolina Recycling & Disposa4 Inc., 653 F. Supp. at 993. On appeal, the fourth
circuit affirmed the district court, stating that the defendant landowner-lessors could not
have satisfied the elements necessary to establish the "third-party defense":
First, the site-owners could not establish the absence of a direct or indirect
contractual relationship necessary to maintain the affirmative defense. They con-
cede they entered into a lease agreement with COCC. They accepted rent from
COCC, and after SCRDI was incorporated, they accepted rent from SCRDI. Sec-
ond, the site-owners presented no evidence that they took precautionary action
against the foreseeable conduct of COCC or SCRDI. They argued to the trial
court that, although they were aware COCC was a chemical manufacturing com-
pany, they were completely ignorant of all waste disposal activities at [the leased
premises] before 1977. They maintained that they never inspected the site prior
to that time. In our view, the statute does not sanction such willful or negligent
blindness on the part of absentee owners. The district court committed no error
in entering summary judgment against the site-owners.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 169 (citations omitted).
248. 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987), affd sub norn. United States v. R. W. Meyer,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
249. See Northernaire Plating Go., 670 F. Supp. at 744.
250. Id.
251. See id. at 745. The United States alleged that the cost of removal was approximately
$173,000. Id.
252. See id. at 748 (discussing the merits of a "third-party defense"). See also The 1980
Act § 107(b) (3), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988).
253. Northernaire Plating Co., 760 F. Supp. at 748.
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Citing Argent Corp. and South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., the
Northernaire court concluded that the defense was not available to the
defendant landowner-lessor because it had not satisfied the second
element.254 "[The tenant] leased the facility from [the landowner-les-
sor]. This contractual relationship preclude [d] either of these defend-
ants from invoking the protections of Section [107(b) (3)] by arguing
that the other defendant [was] the third party which was the cause of
the release."
255
Thus, the Argent Corp., South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
and Northernaire cases all stand for the proposition that a defendant
landowner-lessor automatically is precluded from asserting a "third-
party defense" when the acts or omissions of a tenant result in a "re-
lease" or "threatened release" on the leased premises leading to the
expenditure of response costs. Although, at least on the surface, these
cases seem to utilize the statutory language appropriately, 256 upon
closer inspection, this becomes doubtful.
The language found in section 107(b) (3) states in pertinent part:
There shall be no liability ... [if] the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by... (3) an act or omission of
a third party other than an employee or agent of the defend-
ant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly,
with the defendant .... 257
Consistent with the later SARA definition of "contractual relationship"
found in Section 101 (35), the Argent Corp., South Carolina Recycling &
Disposal, Inc., and Northernaire courts held that a lease agreement does
constitute a "contractual relationship" for purposes of Section
107(b) (3) .25 After reaching this conclusion, however, the same
courts proceeded to bar the "third-party defense" solely because there
was a contractual relationship between the defendant landowner-les-
sor and the tenant, choosing not to determine expressly whether or
254. Id. (citing the existence of the lease agreement as the dispositive factor establishing
a contractual relationship that would render the third-party defense unavailable).
255. Id.
256. See Dorothy M. Helms & Nancy P, Jeffries, Liabilities of Landlords and Tenants Under
CERCLA, 41 S.C. L. REv. 815, 819 (1990) (discussing Argent Corp., South Carolina Recycling &
Disposa Inc., and Northernaire, and summarizing that "if there is a 'contractual relationship'
with the third party who caused the release, section 107(b) (3) is not applicable and liability
follows").
257. See The 1980 Act § 107(b), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988)
(emphasis added). See also supra text accompanying note 106.
258. See CERCLA § 101 (35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988).
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not the acts or omissions of the third party took place in connection
with the contractual relationship-in these cases, the lease agree-
ment.259  In so holding, the courts ignored relevant statutory
language.
In defense of the courts in Argent Corp., South Carolina Recycling &
Disposal, Inc., and Northernaire, one might suggest that the end result of
these cases would have been the same had the courts explicitly ad-
dressed the "connection" issue. 26 Moreover, there is at least some
basis in the legislative history for the position taken by the courts.26'
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the statutory language requires an "in
connection with" test, not merely a finding of the "presence" of a
"contractual relationship."262 The drafters certainly could have cre-
ated such a "presence" standard, rather than an "in connection with"
standard, had they wished. The statutory language in Section
107(b) (3) could have read: "There shall be no liability ... [if] the
release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages
resulting therefrom were caused solely by... (3) an act or omission of
a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant; an act
or omission of a third party other than one who has a direct or indi-
rect contractual relationship with the defendant .... "
Further difficulty arises with such language, however. The "em-
ployee" or "agent" language becomes somewhat superfluous, except
259. See, e.g., Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. at 748 (noting that the defendants did
not meet the second element of the third-party defense because there was a contractual
relationship with the third party).
260. This Article sets forth criteria for evaluating the "connection" requirement. See
infra text accompanying notes 322-334 (discussing the "in connection with" clause of CER-
CLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988)).
261. See 126 CONG. REc. 26,783 (1980). Rep. Gore first stated that the "third-party de-
fense" is limited to situations "where the third party is not an employee or agent of the
defendant, or where the third party's act or omission does not occur in connection with a
contractual relationship." Id. In his next sentence, however, Rep. Gore made a cryptic
statement that can be interpreted as directly contradicting his previous statement: "[T]he
amendment would permit a defendant to escape liability for damages caused by the act or
omission of a third party who has no connection whatsoever with the defendant and which
act or omission is unforeseeable." Id.
A plausible explanation for this apparent contradiction is that, in his second sentence,
Rep. Gore accidentally said the word "who" instead of "which." Rep. Gore may have meant
to say: "[T]he amendment would permit the defendant to escape liability for damages
caused by the act or omission of a third party which has no connection whatsoever with the
defendant and which act or omission is unforeseeable." Such a statement would be consis-
tent with the preceding sentence and with the § 107(b)(3) requirement that the third
party's act or omission be the sole cause of the release; that the defendant was not a
"cause" of the act or omission. See also The 1980 Act § 107(b), codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
262. See The 1980 Act § 107(b), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
200 [VOL. 53:157
1994] LANDOWNER-LESSOR LIABILIT UNDER CERCLA
perhaps to the extent that it provides examples of a broader class of
"contractual relationships," because employees or agents of the de-
fendant necessarily would have a contractual relationship with the de-
fendant.263 Thus, the statutory language might have been even more
abbreviated: there shall be no liability [if] the release or threat of re-
lease of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by- (3) an act or omission of a third party with
whom the defendant does not have a contractual relationship.
Employing the SARA amendments, two arguments can be made
against this Article's interpretation of the "in connection with" re-
quirement suggested above. The first argument would be that Con-
gress only intended to create the narrow exception to liability
provided in the "innocent landowner" defense of Section 101 (35).264
Because the activities of the tenant in possession leading to the "re-
lease" or "threatened release" necessarily would entail "disposal or
placement of the hazardous substance, on, in, or at the facility" after
the defendant landowner-lessor had "acquired" the property, the
"third-party defense" would be unavailable to the landowner-lessor.
The legislative history, however, does not provide significant sup-
port for such an interpretation. As discussed earlier, Representative
Frank originally introduced the "innocent landowner" amendment in
263. SeeJ. B. Ruhl, The Third-Party Defense to Hazardous Waste Liability: Narrowing the Con-
tractual Relationship Exception, 29 S. TEx. L. lEv. 291, 297 (1987). Ruhl argues,
The [third party] defense provision . . . excludes from the category of the term
"third party" any employee or agent of the defendant. If the language following
that exclusion, that is, the contractual relationship language, were not read so as
to refer to similar control-based relationships, the employee or agent exclusion
would be superfluous; any employee or agent of the defendant necessarily would
be involved in a direct or indirect contractual relationship with the defendant.
Thus, the contractual relationship language should be interpreted as referring
not literally to any contractual relationship, but rather, consistent with the scope
of the employee or agent exclusion, to any analogous contractual relationship
extending a sufficient degree of control to the defendant over the third party's
treatment of the regulated substance ....
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)
Mr. Ruhl's linguistic analysis, while very interesting, does not point to an interpreta-
tion that is necessarily true. More accurately, it could be said that not every act or omission
of a party to a contract need be "in connection with" the relevant "contractual relation-
ship" in order to satisfy § 107(b) (3). Moreover, the test for determining "in connection
with a contractual relationship" need not be confined to a "control" criterion. Given the
policy arguments set forth infra text accompanying notes 316-324, it makes more sense to
develop appropriate criteria for interpreting "in connection with" and to retain a conven-
tional interpretation of "contractual relationship." Among other things, this would avoid
the awkwardness of saying that parties to a contract do not have a "contractual
relationship."
264. See CERCLA § 101 (35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 180.
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the House. 265 Because there was no similar language in the Senate
bill, there is a basis for assuming that the Frank amendment was the
impetus for the language finally adopted by the Conference Commit-
tee. Frank's remarks, as well as the floor debate, seem to evidence not
an intent to limit what already was available under the "third-party
defense," but rather a desire to ensure that the defense, at least in the
innocent purchaser situation, would be available.266 Representative
Eckart, expressing concern in his remarks and in his amendment,
seemed to desire not to expand the "third-party defense" beyond what
already was available, rather than to narrow the existing language in
The 1980 Act.2
67
Finally, the comments of the committee drafting the Conference
Report also appear not to support a "narrowing" interpretation.268
The Report consistently refers to the requirements for asserting the
"innocent landowner defense" provided in Section 101 (35), without
any language suggesting that Section 101 (35) was intended to limit
the application of Section 107(b) (3) to "innocent purchasers."
Rather, the Conference Report language suggests that, in addition to
meeting the requirements of Section 101 (35), those who would assert
the "innocent landowner defense" also must comply with the require-
ments of Section 107(b) (3).269
The second argument against the "in connection with" interpre-
tation suggested above is based upon the de minimis settlement provi-
sion found in Section 122(g) (1) and (2) of CERCLA.27' That
language can be interpreted as containing a presumption that a cur-
rent landowner always will be held strictly liable for releases resulting
from the storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous substances oc-
curring during ownership. Therefore, liability is presumed; Section
122(g) merely permits the Environmental Protection Agency to reach
a settlement with a landowner for a limited amount of money after
considering that landowner's lack of participation in the polluting ac-
tivities. This second argument, however, also is not persuasive.
265. See 126 CONG. REc. 34,715 (1980). See also supra text accompanying notes 158-159.
266. See 126 CONG. REc. 34,715-18 (1980). See also supra notes 159-168 and accompany-
ing text (quoting the floor debate, including remarks of Rep. Frank).
267. See 126 CONG. REc. 34,717 (1980). See also supra notes 165-167 and accompanying
text (quoting the floor debate, including remarks of Rep. Eckart).
268. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186-87 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3279-80. See also supra note 181 (containing excerpts from House Con-
ference Report).
269. See H.R. CONG. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186-87 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3279-80. See also supra note 181.
270. See CERCLA § 122(g)(1) and (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) and (2) (1988). See also
supra text accompanying note 184.
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The relevant legislative history must be taken into account in in-
terpreting Section 122(g). As noted earlier, the de minimis provision
was inserted at the Committee stage in the House of Representatives,
while the Frank amendment on the "innocent landowner" defense
was adopted during the floor debate in the House. 27 1 Although the
representatives' remarks during the floor debate suggest that each
measure was intended to deal with the "innocent landowner" situa-
tion, there is no indication that the de minimis provision was in-
tended to operate in exclusion either of the Section 101(35)
"innocent landowner" defense or of any defense available under Sec-
tion 107(b) (3).272
Moreover, although
[t]he situations in which a property owner may qualify for a
de minimis settlement [are] remarkably similar to the situa-
tions in which the owner would not be liable under the "in-
nocent purchaser" defense . . . . [S]ection 122(g) (1) (B)
seems broader, allowing the unknowing purchaser of con-
taminated property to obtain a de minimis settlement though
perhaps [the purchaser is] technically not qualified for the
defense.273
In a "guidance" issued by the EPA in 1989, however, the agency ap-
peared "to take the position that only persons that 'may ultimately be
able to prove a third party defense' are within the scope of the de
minimis provision."274 Under either interpretation of Section 122(g),
271. See supra text accompanying notes 186-187 (discussing the adoption of the innocent
landowner defense and the de minimis settlement provision).
272. See supra 151-157 and accompanying text (quoting the debates among Representa-
tives regarding the applicability of the de minimis settlement provision).
273. LicHT, supra note 11, at 221.
274. Id. The "guidance" referred to in the text is found in EPA, Superfund Program; De
Minimis Landouner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989):
The requirement[s] which must be satisfied in order for the Agency to con-
sider a settlement which (sic:with] landowners under the de minimis settlement
provisions of Section 122(g)(1)(B) are substantially the same as the elements
which must be proved at trial in order for a landowner to establish a third party
defense under Section 107(b) (3) and Section 101 (35).
... Since it serves no purpose to require a landowner who satisfies the ele-
ments of section 107(b) (3) and who wishes to obtain legal repose to incur the
litigation costs of establishing the defense at trial, if the Agency determines that
the landowner has a persuasive case that each of these elements has been met,
the Agency will entertain an offer for a de minimis settlement under 122 (g) (1) (B).
Id. at 34,237-38. Cf supra notes 165, 167 (containing the remarks of Rep. Eckart). But see
supra text accompanying notes 155-157 (containing the remarks of Reps. Packard and Roe,
apparently encouraging EPA to engage in settlements with "non-participating" landowners
in situations where disposal activities were taking place during the ownership period).
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it is clear that there is little support for the previously suggested argu-
ment that the enactment of Section 122(g)(1) and (2) implies that
Congress intended that landowners always be held liable for releases
occurring during their ownership. 275 Finally, there is case law that
supports the "in connection with" interpretation suggested above.
In Shapiro v. Alexanderson,276 a post-SARA case, the defendant
landowners agreed to sell property to a purchaser for use as a landfill
and allowed the purchaser to use the property for this purpose prior
to closing. 277 Due to a complex set of circumstances, the vendee in
possession retained this "quasi-tenant" status for approximately six-
teen months, and used the property as a landfill throughout this time
period. 278 A "release" or "threatened release" of hazardous substances
occurred as a result of "the emanation of hazardous leachate" caused
by water percolating through the dumped material.27 9
The landowner-vendors in Shapiro argued that they were shielded
from liability under Section 107(b) (3) on the basis that any release or
threatened release was caused solely by the acts of the vendee in pos-
session.2 10 The court, however, held that the "third-party defense" was
not available to the defendant owners because "the landfill was oper-
ated by the [vendee in possession] 'in connection with a contractual
relationship' with the owners." 28' In a subsequent opinion involving
the same case, the court elaborated upon its interpretation of Section
107(b) (3):
The Court, however, does not embrace the view that the con-
tractual relationship clause encompasses all acts by a third
party with any contractual relationship with a defendant.
Such a construction would render the language "in connec-
tion with" mere surplusage. The act or omission must occur
in a context so that there is a connection between the acts
and the contractual relationship. For example, the classic
scenario in which courts preclude a covered person from as-
serting a Section [107(b) (3)] defense is when the covered
275. See Ruhl, supra note 263, at 299 (utilizing a different analytic approach than that
presented in this Article, but nevertheless arguing that not every "contractual relationship
is of the type contemplated by the 'in connection with' exception to the § 9607(b) (3)
'third party defense'").
276. 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
277. Id. at 474-75. The contract allowed the purchaser to commence landfill operations
upon signing the contract and resolution by the Board of Supervisors. Id
278. Id. at 475. After a 16-month period of using the property as a landfill the contract
was terminated. Id.
279. Id. at 477.
280. Id. at 478.
281. Id.
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person asserting the defense is a landowner and the third-
party is operating the landfill pursuant to a contract with the
owner. The acts or omissions of that operator, while operat-
ing the landfill, are in connection with the landowner-opera-
tor contract and therefore preclude the owner's assertion of
the Section [107(b) (3) ] defense. 82
Similarly, in United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc.,
283
another post-SARA case, the court applied an "in connection with"
analysis in a landowner-lessor context.2184 The facts in A & N Cleaners
disclose that a predecessor owner, Six & Twenty-Two, leased a build-
ing, parking lot, and land to Marine Midland Bank for a period of ten
years, with two successive five year renewal options.285 Marine exer-
cised the renewal options and subleased portions of the building for
various periods of time between 1970 and 1990.286 The building was
located approximately 900 feet from a water "well field," which sup-
plied drinking water to the local community.287 The parking lot was
built directly over a "dry well" and the floor drains in the building also
allegedly emptied into the "dry well." 2
88
Under the initial 1970 lease between Marine and the owner,
Marine had the "right to sublet all or part of the [leased]
[p]roperty."289 Marine actually took the 1970 lease subject to existing
leases, which were assigned to it by Six & Twenty-Two. 290 A company
called Pircio's held one of these subleases that terminated on Novem-
ber 30, 1972.291 While in possession, Pircio's used the portion of the
leased building for a dry cleaning business. 2  The Pircio's sublease
provided that "the premises were to be used and occupied as a dry
cleaning establishment and that responsibility for the care and main-
tenance of the Dry Well belonged to Pircio's. "293
On October 5, 1970, Marine instructed Pircio's to "make all rent
payments to Marine 'as your new landlord.'"2 94 Soon thereafter,
Pircio's apparently assigned its sublease to a company called A & N
282. Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 743 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
283. 788 F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
284. Id. at 1326.
285. Id. at 1320. Hereinafter, the Marine Midland Bank will be referred to as "Marine."
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1320-21.
288. Id. at 1320.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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Cleaners295 and "A & N occupied the premises as a dry cleaning busi-
ness." 29 6 Marine extended the sublease that had been assigned to A &
N Cleaners through 1977 and gave A & N an option to renew.
2 97
In 1979, the defendant landowner-lessor, the Berkman Group,
purchased the property from Six & Twenty-Two subject to the existing
lease and subleases.298 A & N Cleaners exercised its renewal option
through 1982, when it entered into a new sublease with Marine 29 9 that
"specifically provided that the premises would be used and occupied
for a dry cleaning, rug cleaning and laundry establishment." °° A & N
Cleaners continued to sublet the property and run its dry cleaning
business through 1992.301
Beginning in 1970, and continuing through either 1978 or 1983,
A & N Cleaners dumped chemically contaminated waste water into
the floor drain of the building on a regular basis.30 2 In 1978, it was
discovered that the water in the adjoining "well field" was contami-
nated.30 3 In 1987, a study "identified the Dry Well as a source of...
contamination. "304 Thus, the cleaner's "release" of hazardous sub-
stances led to the incurrence of response costs. 30 5
In A & N Cleaners, the landowner-lessor Berkman Group argued
that it was shielded from Section 107(b) liability by reason of the
"third-party defense."30 6 The landowner-lessor asserted that it was not
liable because there was no "direct" or "indirect" contractual relation-
ship between the landowner-lessor and A & N Cleaners, who had
dumped the waste.30 7 The court agreed that there was no "direct or
indirect contractual relationship" for purposes of Section 107(b) (3),
finding that under New York common law there was no privity of con-
295. See id.
296. Id.
297. See id. (noting that Pircio's lease was extended, and in turn A & N Cleaners was
given an option to renew its sublease for one three-year term and one two-year term).
298. Id. at 1321.
299. See id. at 1320.
300. Id. at 1320-21.
301. See id. at 1321 (noting that even at the time of the opinion, A & N Cleaners contin-
ued to occupy the building).
302. See id. (noting that A & N Cleaners' operator admitted disposing a solvent, PCE,
"through the floor drain of the property").
303. See id.
304. See id. (noting that the study identified the dry well as a source of the well field
contamination).
305. See id. at 1325 (noting that a causal connection existed between the release of haz-
ardous substances by A & N Cleaners and the incurrence of response costs).
306. See id. at 1326.
307. See id. (noting that the landowner-lessors had no lease with A & N Cleaners; the
lease was with Marine).
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tract between a landowner-lessor and a sublessee who leases from an
intermediary tenant sublessor.3 0 ' The court found it significant that
(1) no rent was paid directly from the sublessee to the landowner-
lessor; (2) the sublessee was "not directly liable to the original lessor
for performance of the covenants contained in the [primary] lease";
and (3) under New York law, "the [primary] lessor may not maintain
an action [directly] against the sub[lessee] for breach of the [primary]
lease."3 °9 The court, however, refused to grant summaryjudgment in
favor of the landowner-lessor, stating that there were present triable
issues of fact as to the "due care" and "precautions" requirements of
Section 107(b) (3) (a) and (b). l°
The court in A & N Cleaners also considered the potential liability
of Marine, the tenant-sublessor" l After finding that Marine was an
"owner" for purposes of Section 107(a) (2), the court addressed
Marine's asserted "third-party defense": "[t]he lease agreement be-
tween Marine and A & N constitutes a direct contractual relationship.
This finding is not dispositive of the availability of the "third-party de-
fense" to Marine, however." 12 Citing a Second Circuit opinion as au-
thority, the A & N Cleaners court described what it found to be the
relevant standard for adjudicating whether a third-party defense is
available:
"The mere existence of a contractual relationship between
the owner of land on which hazardous substances are or
have been disposed and a third party whose act or omission
was the sole cause of the release or threatened release of such
hazardous substances into the environment does not fore-
close the owner of the land from escaping liability .... In
order for the landowner to be barred from raising the third-
party defense under such circumstances, the contract be-
tween the landowner and the third party must either relate
to the hazardous substances or allow the landowner to exert
some element of control over the third party's activities." 13
308. Id. at 1327-28.
309. Id. But see Fulway Corp. v. Liggett Drug Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 222, 231 (N.Y. App. Div.
1956) (applying New York law, the court granted injunctive relief on behalf of the primary
lessor against the sublessee in possession, where sublessee was in violation of a restrictive
covenant contained in the primary lease).
310. See A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. at 1329-30.
311. Id. at 1330.
312. Id. at 1334-35.
313. Id. at 1335 (quoting Westwood Pharmaceuticals v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp.,
964 F.2d 85, 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1992)). In Westwood Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiff purchaser,
Westwood, sought summary judgment as to the § 107(a) liability of the defendant, Na-
tional Fuel (the successor corporation to the seller of the property, Iroquois Gas Corpora-
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Applying the above standard to the facts in A & N Cleaners, the court
stated:
The contract between Marine and A & N relates to hazard-
ous substances. Both the Pircio's Lease and the 1982 Lease
specifically provide that the premises are to be used for a dry
cleaning establishment. A & N used hazardous substances as
a matter of course in conducting its business. Thus, "the
contract between the landowner and the third party some-
how is connected with the handling of hazardous sub-
stances," making the third party defense unavailable to
Marine. 14
The courts' decisions in Shapiro and A & N Cleaners support the
assertion that an analysis of the "third-party defense" in the land-
owner-lessor/tenant context must, in addition to finding the presence
of a contractual relationship, consider whether the acts or omissions
of the third party who caused the release took place in connection with
the contractual relationship. Nevertheless, questions remain regard-
ing when there is a sufficient "connection" with the contractual rela-
tionship. The A & N Cleaners court did not articulate the policy
underlying its interpretation of the criteria for determining whether
such a "connection" exists. In the landowner-lessor/tenant context, it
certainly makes sense to analyze the "connection" test in light of the
lease relationship, but it is questionable whether it makes sense to re-
quire either: (1) landowner-lessor "control;" or (2) a lease contract
tion). Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 86. The trial court denied the motion for
summary judgment because there were triable issues of fact as to whether or not the re-
lease of toxic substances occurred "in connection with" the purchase agreement "contrac-
tual relationship." Id. at 86-87. The defendant argued that the eventual release of
hazardous substances from secure underground storage tanks, which actually resulted
from the purchaser's post-sale construction activities, did not take place "in connection
with" a "contractual relationship" for purposes of the § 107(b) (3) "third-party defense."
Id. at 87. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling,
rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the enactmentof§ 101(35)(C) necessarily precludes
previous owners of property upon which hazardous substances were disposed or placed
from successfully asserting the "third-party defense":
[Section] 101(35) shields innocent landowners from liability for the release or
threatened release of contaminants caused solely by the act or omission of a third
party, even though the act or omission of the third pany occurred "in connection with a
contractual relationship" with the innocent landowner.
Logic suggests that Congress intended § 101 (35) (C) merely to circumscribe
the parameters of the innocent landowner exception set forth in
§ 101 (35) (A)and(B), and not to abrogate completely the right of previous owners
to raise the third-party defense set forth in § 107(b) (3).
Id. at 90.
314. A & N Cleaners, 788 F. Supp. at 1335 (citations omitted).
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that implicitly or explicitly refers to the use or storage of "hazardous
substances" on the leased premises by the tenant in possession.
The statements of Representative Florio,315 who originally intro-
duced House Bill 7020, indicate that an important statutory policy un-
derlying CERCLA is that of preventing or minimizing "releases" of
hazardous substances and preventing or minimizing damage to public
health and the environment resulting from "releases."3 16 Florio's re-
marks suggest that when possible the statute should be construed to
provide incentives to encourage persons to take actions designed to
prevent releases or conditions likely to result in releases. 317 Given this
policy perspective, the criteria set forth in A & N Cleaners to deter-
mine whether a sufficient "connection" exists are inadequate.318
First, the "relation to hazardous substances" test set forth in A &
N Cleaners encourages an owner-lessor to leave the lease silent as to its
"purpose" (e.g., dry cleaning operations), so that the lease contract,
on its face, will not be "related" to the use of hazardous substances.31 9
Along the same line, the "control" test provides an incentive for land-
owner-lessors not to include lease clauses that restrict the presence or
use of hazardous substances, out of fear that such clauses might pro-
vide a "connection" that would prevent them from asserting the
"third-party defense."320 Thus, from the policy standpoint of prevent-
ing hazardous waste releases, the A & N Cleaners holding is in some
respects inferior to the Argent line of cases because the Argent cases
preclude the third-party defense from being asserted in all lease situa-
tions and thus provide an incentive for landowner-lessors to include
restrictive clauses and to monitor and enforce those restrictions
carefully.321
To promote the important statutory policy of preventing releases
of hazardous waste in the first instance and to give meaning to the "in
connection with" language, courts must take a different approach to
interpreting that phrase. The interpretation described below is in-
tended to discourage absentee landlord practices and to promote the
inclusion, monitoring, and enforcement of appropriate restrictive
clauses in leases. This Article proposes that:
315. See 126 CONG. REc. 26,337 (1980).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39 (containing remarks of Rep. Florio).
317. See id.
318. See supra text accompanying note 313.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 313-314.
320. Id.
321. See United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA), 1356, 1358 (D.N.M.
1984) (holding that, as a matter of law, the "third-party defense" could not be established
by the landowner-lessor in relation to acts or omissions of a tenant).
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(1) Any presence of a hazardous substance on leased
premises that is not completely prohibited by a lease should
be considered to be "in connection with" any act or omission
of the tenant that causes a release or threatened release of
that hazardous substance.
(2) Any tenant activities on the leased premises that the
landowner-lessor knows or has reason to know will involve
the presence of hazardous substances should be considered
"in connection with" any act or omission of the tenant that
causes a release or threatened release of any such hazardous
substance.322
(3) Any landowner-lessor actions relating to the pres-
ence, monitoring, and enforcement of clauses restricting the
presence of hazardous substances ordinarily should not be
considered either a "cause" of a release or threatened release
by a tenant, or "in connection with" a contractual lease rela-
tionship with the tenant.123
322. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 263, at 299. In the context of an analysis arguing for a
"causation" element in the definition of "contractual relationship," Ruhl develops a sepa-
rate test for "in connection with" that is similar to the second criterion ("knows or has
reason to know") stated in the above text: "[W]henever the purpose or subject matter of
the contract expressly or by reasonable implication encompasses the handling of hazard-
ous waste, the contract should be deemed to be in connection with the acts or omissions of
either party which are the sole cause of a release." Id. Ruhl's test for "contractual relation-
ship," however, appears to be inconsistent with the first and third criteria stated in the
above text.
323. If a landowner-lessor, or an officer, stockholder, employee, or agent of the land-
owner-lessor, is found to be an "operator" of a facility on the leased premises for purposes
of CERCLA, then the "third-party defense" may be unavailable with respect to a release or
threatened release on the leased premises "caused" by the act or omission of the tenant in
possession. If the test utilized to determine the statutory designation of "operator" em-
ploys activity-oriented criteria requiring actual participation in the daily operations on the
leased premises, then an "operator" determination necessarily would preclude the "third-
party defense" because such a defendant, as an actual participant in the daily operations
on the leased premises, would "know or have reason to know" of any activity involving the
presence of hazardous substances on the leased premises.
If a court were to consider the inclusion, monitoring, and enforcement of restrictive
lease clauses as constituting "participation," however, an "operator" determination based
on such facts alone would not preclude the successful assertion of the "third-party defense"
under the criteria stated in the text. The possibility that courts would perform such an
"actual participation" analysis is suggested in Levin Metals, Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Termi-
nal Co., 781 F. Supp. 1454, 1458 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that an officer was not liable as
a CERCLA "operator" when he did not participate in the actual management of the
facility).
If the test utilized to confer an "operator" designation upon a landowner-lessor, or an
officer, stockholder, employee, or agent of a landowner-lessor, is based primarily upon the
status of the defendant, then again an "operator" designation would not automatically pre-
clude the successful assertion of the "third-party defense" because, as a matter of policy,
the "operator" essentially stands in the same position as an "owner," and thus should have
the same capacity to assert the defense. The possibility that courts would adopt such a
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In addition to the above proposal, as a further disincentive to ab-
sentee landlord practices, this Article suggests that the precautions re-
quired in Section 107(b) (3)324 be interpreted as not only permitting,
but also requiring, periodic inspections by the landowner-lessor. The
extent and frequency of inspection required would depend upon the
circumstances. For example, the letting of a single family house, the
use of which is restricted to residential purposes, ordinarily would re-
quire only minimal inspection. On the other hand, a commercial ten-
ancy-involving a warehouse, for example-would require more
frequent and extensive inspections. For office space leases, the in-
spection stringency would fall somewhere between residential and
commercial. To standardize the frequency and seriousness of inspec-
tions, the Environmental Protection Agency could issue regulations
that set forth minimum inspection criteria for certain types of leases.
Applying the foregoing standard to the hypothetical situations
previously considered, it is clear that Larry Landowner, as the defend-
ant landowner-lessor in the first case, would not succeed in asserting
the "third-party defense" because the lease in question does not con-
tain a clause prohibiting hazardous substances on the leased premises.
Furthermore, by reason of the tenant's manufacturing activities, the
landowner-lessor knew or had reason to know that such substances
would be present. Finally, Larry Landowner did not periodically in-
spect the leased premises for possible contamination.
In the second hypothetical situation, involving Rose Realty, the
lease contains a clause prohibiting toxic substances on the leased
premises. Additionally, Rose Realty appears to have no actual knowl-
edge that hazardous substances are present, nor would the type of
business involved seem to provide Rose Realty with reason to know
that toxic substances were present on the leased premises. Neverthe-
less, Rose Realty probably would not meet the monitoring or inspec-
tion requirement that would permit her to assert the "third-party
defense" successfully.
Furthermore, because the Rose Realty lease contemplates com-
mercial tenancy and use of a main building and a storage building on
the leased premises, it is foreseeable that a commercial tenant might
status" oriented approach is suggested in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 22
Envtl. L. Rep. 20079, 20083 (D. Md. 1991), affd in part, revd in part, 966 F.2d 837 (4th
Cir.), crt. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992) (stating that the court agreed with cases that look to
the individual's authority to control "a facility's waste disposal activities in determining...
liability under CERCLA").
324. See CERCIA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988) (noting that in order to
escape liability, the defendant must establish that precautions "against foreseeable acts or
omissions of [a] ... third party" were taken). See also supra text accompanying note 106.
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try to store hazardous substances in the storage building. Rose Realty,
therefore, would be under an obligation to stop by periodically and
visually inspect the premises. The facts indicate that the landowner-
lessor had a right under the lease to inspect the premises, but that no
inspections actually occurred. If Rose Realty had performed inspec-
tions on a monthly basis, had discovered the hazardous substances,
had brought immediate legal action, and had notified the proper au-
thorities, Rose Realty would have no liability for any response costs
resulting from a release or threatened release occurring between
inspections.
Finally, it is appropriate to take another look at the court's deci-
sion in A & N Cleaners in light of the "prevention-incentive" policy
suggested in this Article and to examine the landowner-lessor's ability
to assert the "third-party defense" successfully. By insulating the land-
owner-lessor in A & N Cleaners from liability for the acts of a subles-
see,3 25 the A & N Cleaners court may be tacitly encouraging owners to
shield themselves from potential liability for anticipated and known
uses of hazardous substances on leased premises by potential lessees
using "intervening" tenants, or "middlemen." By permitting land-
owner-lessors to escape liability when sublessees release hazardous
substances, the A & N Cleaners rule diminishes the landowner-lessors'
incentive to include, monitor, and enforce lease clauses that restrict
the presence of hazardous substances on the leased premises.
The A & N Cleaners court's analysis is unpersuasive. The court
appears to base its analysis upon the fact that the sublessee did not
"directly" contract with the landowner-lessor and thus was not in con-
tractual "privity" with the sublessee.126 The court found it significant
that (1) the sublessee did not pay rent directly to the landowner-les-
sor; (2) the sublessee was not liable directly to the landowner-lessor
for nonperformance of the primary lease covenants; and (3) the land-
owner-lessor could not have maintained an action against the subles-
see for a breach of the primary lease. 27 Although it is true that there
is no "direct" contractual relationship between the landowner-lessor
and the sublessee, the real question is whether there is an "indirect"
contractual relationship for purposes of Section 107(b) (3). It can be
forcefully argued that an "indirect" relationship exists precisely be-
cause the landowner-lessor, who permits subleases in the lease agree-
ment, necessarily knows that the tenant can or will sublease all or part
of the property to a third party. The A & N Cleaners court does not
325. See supra text accompanying note 308.
326. Id
327. A & N Cleaners, 788 F. Supp. at 1327-28. See also supra text accompanying note 309.
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present a persuasive argument as to why this situation does not consti-
tute an "indirect" contractual relationship. Moreover, CERCLA does
not limit the term "indirect" to situations in which contractual privity
exists. In fact, the term suggests that such privity is not required.
3 11
There seems to be little reason, as a matter of policy, to distin-
guish a direct tenancy from a subtenancy for purposes of CERCLA
liability. 329 The landowner-lessor ordinarily can enforce restrictive
lease clauses in the primary lease against the sublessee by evicting or
threatening to evict the direct tenant, under whom the sublessee
holds the leasehold interest.33 ° Additionally, even if there is no privity
of contract between the landowner-lessor and the sublessee, the land-
owner-lessor retains the ability to enforce restrictive lease covenants in
equity against a sublessee in possession. 31 The sublessee does not
need to have actual notice of the restriction because the sublessee is
328. See CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (3) (1988) (providing no indication
that the term "indirect" is limited to situations in which there is privity of contract).
329. "If the tenant transfers the leasehold for the entire term in all or a part of the
leased premises, the transfer is an assignment. If, however, the tenant retains a reversion,
the transfer is a sublease." JOHN E. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF PROPERTY 271 (3d
ed. 1989).
330. See, e.g., Boston Properties v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 185 Cal. Rptr. 56, 60 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982) (noting that "since the subtenant's tenancy is subordinate to the covenants of the
master lease, if they are breached by the subtenant the landlord can terminate the master
lease . . . ." (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); Commercial Auto. Loan Corp. v.
Keith, 53 S.E.2d 381, 383-84 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949) (holding that a provision in the primary
lease restricting use of the leased premises to making "loans and automobile financing"
prohibited use of the premises by sublessee as a restaurant).
This "eviction/threat of eviction" argument also seems to have been made by the gov-
ernment in A & N Cleaners. See A & N Cleaners, 788 F. Supp. at 1328 (arguing that the
landowner-lessors could have requested or required their tenant to take action against the
sublessee, A & N Cleaners). The court, however, did not find that argument persuasive.
See id.
331. RESTATEMENT (FissT) OF PROPERTY § 539 (1944) (noting that "a [negative] promise
respecting the use of land is effective [in equity] against the successors in title or possession
of the promisor"). Similarly, "[i] t has been noted.., that the privity requirements have not
been applied in equity," and thus, that an adverse possessor, for example, can be "bound
[by] a restrictive covenant in equity .... " Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises
Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REv. 167, 190 n.59 (1970) (citations omitted). In the
landlord-tenant context, "[a) restriction on use, included in the prime lease, binds a sub-
tenant." 1 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 7.702 (3d ed. 1990) (citations omit-
ted). Professor Cribbet describes the policy rationale underlying this rule:
A sublessee holds a new leasehold estate carved out by the tenant, therefore
is not in privity of estate with the landlord, and accordingly is not liable to the
landlord for rent or most other obligations in the lease. However, there are im-
portant exceptions. Provisions (promissory or otherwise) in leases that prohibit
specific acts .., bind even sublessees. The basis for enforcing restrictions against
sublessees is the equity doctrine that a transferee of any interest in land with
notice of restrictions cannot in good conscience disregard them, and therefore
will be restrained from doing so.
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presumed to be aware of restrictive covenants contained in the pri-
mary lease under which the sublessee holds. 3 ' Thus, a primary land-
lord may obtain injunctive relief for a subtenant's violation of a
restrictive covenant in the lease.
Moreover, the argument that a landowner-lessor and a sublessee
have an "indirect" contractual relationship is supported by Washington
v. Time Oil Co.333 Without addressing the nature of either the primary
lease or the sublease, the Washington court found that there was an
"indirect contractual relationship" between the landowner-lessor and
the sublessee in possession of the leased premises.33 a In light of the
arguments presented in this Article and the important "prevention-
incentive" policy articulated above, there are ample grounds for deter-
mining that a landowner-lessor has an "indirect" contractual relation-
ship with a sublessee in possession for purposes of Section 107(b) (3).
Notwithstanding the policy and logical arguments supporting the
"in connection with" position suggested here, several objections to
that interpretation can be raised. The first objection would be that
the remarks of Representative Florio, relating to incentives intended
to prevent releases,3 35 referred to House Bill 7020 as originally intro-
duced. Because the original bill was designed to deal with inactive
waste sites336 and contamination resulting from past conduct, any
"prevention-incentive" policy arguably must be interpreted as merely
encouraging private parties to clean up already-contaminated prop-
CRIBBET, supra note 329, at 273 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Peer v. Wadsworth, 58 A. 379,
383 (N.J. Ch. 1904) (granting injunctive relief for specific performance in favor of a land-
lord to force the sublessee to comply with a restrictive covenant in the primary lease limit-
ing the tenant's right to make physical alterations to the building on the leased premises);
Rosen v. Wolff, 110 S.E. 877, 882 (Ga. 1922) (enjoining a sublessee from violating a provi-
sion in the primary lease limiting the use of the leased premises to use as a bakery); Fulway
Corp. v. Liggett Drug Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 222, 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956) (granting injunctive
relief in favor of a landlord to force the sublessee to comply with a restrictive covenant in
the primary lease that prohibited use of the premises as a "luncheonette or soda fountain
business").
332. See CRIBBE-r, supra note 329, at 273 (noting that "[s]ublessees... are deemed to
have notice of provisions in the prime lease, as they claim under it."). See also FRIEDMAN,
supra note 331, at 384-85 (stating that a sublessee is bound by a restriction in the primary
lease "whether or not the [sublessee] has actual knowledge of the restriction.") (citation
omitted). Accord Peer v. Wadsworth, 58 A. 379, 381 (N.J. Ch. 1904); Cesar v. Virgin, 92 So.
406, 407 (Ala. 1922).
333. 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
334. Id. at 533. Although the court in A & N Cleaners cited the Time Oil ruling, it did not
find that opinion persuasive. A & N Cleaners, 788 F. Supp. at 1327.
335. See supra text accompanying note 39.
336. See supra text accompanying note 36 (describing the purpose of the original bill).
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erty,ss7 rather than requiring the government to do the cleanup (pre-
sumably at a higher cost).
The policy need not be stated so narrowly. It is reasonable to
interpret the "prevention-incentive" policy not only as encompassing
the cleanup of existing contamination, but also as preventing situa-
tions leading to releases or threatened releases. This broader inter-
pretation finds support in Representative Florio's statement that
House Bill 7020, as introduced, "creates a strong incentive both for
prevention of releases and voluntary cleanup of releases by responsi-
ble parties."33 8 Even the original version of House Bill 7020 contained
incentives encouraging preventative activity. Therefore, the final leg-
islation, which is even broader in scope,"3 9 also should be interpreted
as providing incentives encouraging such preventative activity.
A second objection to the "in connection with" interpretation
would be that there is no basis for placing the "prevention-incentive"
policy above the policy that "the costs of chemical poison releases are
[to be] borne by those responsible for the releases."3 40 Upon closer
examination, this objection also appears unpersuasive. Although all
may agree that those "responsible" for releases of hazardous waste
should be required to pay for the cleanups, the question of who is
"responsible" for purposes of the statute remains. A determination of
responsibility will involve an analysis of liability under Section 107(a),
and the "third-party defense" to liability under Section 107(b). That is
precisely the analysis that is being attempted in this Article. Thus,
adopting a "responsibility" policy criterion in the present context does
not advance the formal analysis because one is "rationally" faced with
the choice between simply asserting an interpretation of "responsibil-
ity" without explicit criteria, or merely restating the initial problem in
a different way. Accordingly, an objection to the "indirect" contrac-
tual relationship argument based upon the priority of a "responsibil-
ity" policy is unpersuasive.
337. See, e.g., supra note 48 (containing the remarks of Rep. Florio).
338. 126 CONG. REc. 26,338 (1980) (emphasis added). See also supra text accompanying
note 39 (quoting Rep. Florio).
339. Compare the liability provision in § 107(a) of the initial version of H.R. 7020, quoted
supra note 41, with the amended version of § 107(a), quoted supra note 78, and the final
version of § 107(a), quoted supra text accompanying note 106.
340. 126 CONG. REc. 26,238 (1980). A similar argument is that it is another objective of
the legislation to ensure that the response fund is "replenished." See id. Of course, under
the statute, only those who are deemed "responsible" for a release are required to replen-
ish the fund. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Thus, the "deep pocket"
replenishment argument collapses into a "responsibility" argument, which carries with it
the same weaknesses.
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A third objection relates to the status of landowner-lessors who do
not have restrictive clauses in their leases at present. The question is
whether it would be equitable to impose liability on such landowner-
lessors, who would have had no advance notice of the "prevention-
incentive" policy. Although this objection may seem plausible at first
glance, it cannot withstand closer scrutiny. First, A & N Cleaners ap-
pears to be the first reported case in which a court has adopted an "in
connection with" interpretation of the "third-party defense" in the
landowner-lessor context. Second, A & N Cleaners is a relatively recent
case, so it is probable that relatively few persons have relied upon it in
drafting leases.5 4' Third, in jurisdictions that follow the Argent line of
cases, there is no real possibility of unfairness under the new standard
precisely because the Argent approach bars the assertion of the de-
fense by a landowner-lessor in every case. 42 Thus, lessors relying on
the Argent approach already have an incentive to include restrictive
lease clauses.
Moreover, even when there is no language in the lease explicitly
restricting the presence of hazardous substances on the leased prem-
ises, and thus the "third-party defense" is not available, a landowner-
lessor still may be able to avoid a release or threatened release of
wastes through rigorous monitoring and prevention activities. The
landowner-lessor may find authorization for such oversight in stan-
dard lease language that prohibits "unlawful activities" on the leased
premises.
For example, in the recent case of Sachs v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 43
the plaintiff landowner-lessors alleged that the defendant-lessee's gas-
oline storage tanks may have caused damage to the soil and subsur-
face water on the leased premises. 44 The lease contained a clause
requiring that the "[1 ]essee's use of [the leased] premises shall comply
with all ordinances and laws . . . applicable to [the leased] premises
... ,4' The Sachs court stated that the covenant of "good faith and
fair dealing" as applied to the "no unlawful activity" clause "require [d]
a reasonable means by which the [lessors could] assure themselves as
to the status of environmental hazards which may be the result of the
tenant's activities."3 46 The court reversed the trial court's summary
judgment denying the landowner-lessors declaratory judgment as to
341. See A & N Cleaners, 788 F. Supp. at 1317 (this case was decided in 1992).
342. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1356. See also supra text accompanying note 236.
343. 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
344. See id. at 241.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 242.
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their right to conduct environmental tests on the leased premises and
remanded the case for a factual determination as to the necessity and
scope of further testing.1
4 7
The Sachs case suggests that a release or threatened release of
hazardous substances under CERCLA would violate a lease clause
prohibiting "unlawful" conduct by the tenant, and therefore, would
be a ground for evicting the tenant. Because lease clauses that pro-
hibit the tenant from engaging in unlawful activity are standard in
both commercial and residential leases, Sachs suggests that a landlord
who is not able to prohibit hazardous substances on the leased prem-
ises by other means nevertheless should be able to restrict and moni-
tor the activities of tenants in order to prevent releases or threatened
releases.
A fourth objection to the "in connection with" argument relates
to the definition of "liability" in Section 101(32). 4 That provision
states that "'liable' or 'liability' . . . shall be construed to be the stan-
dard of liability which obtains under section [311 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act] ."3" Thus, CERCLA's "third-party defense" to
"liability" also should be interpreted in light of Section 311 of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act.35 0 This argument lacks merit be-
cause, as noted earlier, the floor debate in the Senate suggests that
Congress had "joint, several, and strict" liability in mind when it
adopted the Section 101 (32) definition.5 1 Moreover, in the House,
Representative Florio specifically stated that reference should be
made to FWPCA Section 311 liability only when there are no specific
provisions in CERCLA.-5 2 Section 107(b) (3) of CERCLA, however,
does contain specific provisions relating to liability defenses, and
therefore, should control.35 3 Finally, the "third-party defense" in
FWPCA Section 311 does not contain the terms "in connection with"
347. Id. at 242-43.
348. See CERCLA § 101 (32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 112.
349. CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988).
350. E.g., Ruhl, supra note 263, at 309 ("In view of the fact that liability under CERCLA
is to be construed as the same standard that applies under the [Federal Water Pollution
Control Act] oil spill prevention provision, the third-party defense provided by the oil spill
statute should guide the interpretation of the corresponding CERCLA provision." (citation
omitted)).
351. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,932, 30,941, 30,950 (1980). See also supra note 115 and ac-
companying text and text accompanying note 117.
352. See 126 CONG. Rc. 31,965 (1980). See also supra text accompanying note 132 (con-
taining the remarks of Rep. Florio).
353. See CERCLA § 107(a) and (b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) and (b) (1988). See also supra
text accompanying note 106.
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or "contractual relationship" as utilized in CERCLA. 54 Accordingly, it
is inappropriate to analyze CERCLA's "third-party defense," which is
closely connected with such phrases, under FWPCA Section 31 1.15
This Article has suggested that certain criteria be employed in
analyzing whether the acts or omissions of a tenant leading to a re-
lease or threatened release of hazardous substances should be
deemed to occur "in connection with" the contractual relationship
created by the lease agreement. One final objection may be that
those criteria cannot be applied in situations outside the landlord-ten-
ant context. If this Article required that the landlord-tenant criteria
identified be applied to other relationships, problems certainly could
arise. There is no need to apply those criteria elsewhere, however,
because "in connection with" need not be interpreted in a univocal
fashion. Rather, appropriate criteria can be developed and applied in
other contexts based upon relevant policies. In the case of a transfer
of title from one person to another, for example, the Section 101 (35)
"innocent landowner defense" added by SARA in 1986, with its accom-
panying legislative history,356 suggests that "not in connection with"
should be interpreted according to criteria no broader than those ap-
plicable to determinations of "no contractual relationship."357 Once
the phrase "in connection with" is understood in this fashion, the
problem suggested above disappears.
CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the liability of a landowner-lessor
under CERCLA for releases or threatened releases caused by the acts
or omissions of a tenant in possession. The Article began with an
overview of the statutory language and proceeded with a discussion of
the legislative history surrounding the passage of The 1980 Act and
the 1986 SARA amendments relevant to its topic. Next, this Article
discussed and analyzed the liability of an "owner" landowner-lessor
under Section 107(a) and concluded that a plausible case for an "in-
nocent landlord" defense could not be found in that language. The
Article next examined the "third-party defense" set forth in Section
107(b) (3).
354. See FWPCA § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1985).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 131-132 (containing the remarks of Rep. Florio
to that effect).
356. See supra note 181 (citing the Conference Report that explains § 101(35) and
§ 107(b) (3)).
357. See CERCLA § 101 (35), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1988). See aso supra text accompany-
ing note 180.
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The Article discussed and critiqued the Argent line of cases on the
basis that those cases failed to consider the "in connection with" lan-
guage found in Section 107(b) (3). The Article also discussed and cri-
tiqued A & N Cleaners, in which the court adopted an "in connection
with" analysis, but applied a test that was objectionable because it en-
couraged landowner-lessors to become "absentee landlords" by pro-
viding them with a disincentive to restrict or monitor the activities of
their tenants in possession. An alternative "prevention-incentive" test
was proposed; this test encourages landowner-lessors to include, moni-
tor, and enforce appropriate lease clauses that restrict the presence of
hazardous substances on the leased premises.
Next, this Article discussed and critiqued the position taken by
the court in A & N Cleaners with respect to landowner-lessor liability as
related to the acts and omissions of a sublessee. The Article con-
cluded that a landowner-lessor can be considered to have an "indirect
contractual relationship" with a sublessee in possession. Several hypo-
thetical objections to the discussion and analysis presented in the Arti-
cle were then proposed, discussed, and found unpersuasive.
Given the foregoing, one can conclude that not all activities of a
tenant should be considered "in connection with a contractual rela-
tionship" with the landowner-lessor. Additionally, a landowner-lessor
can be considered to have an "indirect contractual relationship" with
a sublessee in possession.
The proposed "prevention-incentive" test supports an important
statutory policy: preventing the harmful effects to public health,
safety, and the environment that result from the release of hazardous
substances. Consistent with common sense notions of fair play, per-
sons such as residential landowner-lessors should not be held liable
for the acts or omissions of their tenants in all circumstances. At the
same time, the "third-party defense" is construed narrowly, so that
landowner-lessors will be held strictly liable unless the landowner-les-
sor takes affirmative steps to prohibit the presence of the relevant haz-
ardous substances in the lease, does not know or have reason to know
of the presence of such substances on the leased premises, and
monitors and restricts the activities of the tenant appropriately. This
interpretation is consistent with both the legislative history and our
communal traditions which state that ownership of land requires that
proper stewardship be exercised.358
358. See supra text accompanying note I (stating Professor Powell's reflection on the
development of notions of stewardship in Anglo-American law).
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